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Abstract
We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set
up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one
applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of
applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post
wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility
property which is efficient. Furthermore, we investigate the role of wage-vacancy contracts on welfare and
competition.
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1. Introduction
The directed search approach to modelling markets where trade is decentralized has become
popular in recent years as an alternative to random search models.1 One reason is that it is possi-
ble in directed search models to derive the matching function as an endogenous object resulting
from agents’ optimal search behavior. Another reason is that, although the market structure is
not Walrasian, firms explicitly and directly compete with each other.2 In a labor market con-
text, workers observe the wage or price mechanism offered by all firms, offers that firms are
committed to, and workers can therefore direct their search towards the firm offering them the
highest expected payoff. Hence, prices play a better allocative role than in the random search
framework.3
In standard directed search models a risk-neutral firm has typically one job to fill and the
contract it posts to attract risk-neutral workers is a wage contract, that is, a promise to pay a
given wage to the person who will be hired. If a firm wishes to make itself more attractive to
workers because it wants to increase the probability its vacancy will be filled, it can only do so
by increasing the wage it promises to pay to the worker who will be hired. Hence, firms face a
trade-off between profit net of the wage and the probability of filling the job. At the same time,
when workers apply to this firm with greater probability, the probability that a given worker,
conditional on having applied, is chosen for the job decreases. Hence, workers face a trade-off
between the wage a firm offers and the probability of employment at that firm. This trade-off
limits the extent to which a firm can increase its attractiveness, and indicates that a firm might
wish to mitigate the negative effect of increased competition among workers by compensating
unsuccessful applicants in some way, for instance, by hoarding labor or paying a fee to some
of the unsuccessful applicants. The trade-off faced by workers suggests that the combination
of coordination frictions and the restriction on the type of contracts firms are allowed to post
reduces the extent of competition among firms for workers. This is especially relevant if workers
are risk-averse and they cannot insure themselves perfectly against the risk of unemployment
because markets are incomplete.
In this paper we study a directed search model of the labor market, and the game has two
stages. In the first stage, which we call the entry game, risk-neutral entrepreneurs decide whether
to set up firms. The second stage, which we call the directed search game, is where a stan-
dard directed search sequential game is played: firms first post publicly observable contracts (the
contract-posting game); having observed all contract postings each worker then decides which
firm to apply to (the application subgame). We extend the literature in two dimensions. First, we
consider entry in finite markets whereas the literature has always dealt with entry in infinitely
1 A non-exhaustive list of papers includes Montgomery [23], Peters [24–26], McAfee [20], Burdett et al. [5], Julien
et al. [17,18], Shi [28,29], Shimer [30].
2 Deriving the matching function as an equilibrium object is one difference between directed search models and com-
petitive search models (e.g., Moen [22]). Another difference is that in competitive search models markets are perfectly
competitive, in that firms take as given the expected utility they must offer to workers, whereas, as we will show, in
directed search models firms can have explicit market power in finite economies, though this market power vanishes in
the limit where the limit economy is constructed as the limit of a finite economy – see Galenianos and Kircher [11] for a
detailed analysis of the link between directed and competitive search in this regard.
3 In random search models, if past offers can be recalled or on-the-job search is allowed, two or more firms can
compete directly with each other for a worker. However, this is true for only some of the meetings, and because search is
still random prices do not play as important an allocative role as they do in directed search models.
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large markets.4 Second, and more importantly, we consider an environment where workers are
risk-averse and firms are allowed to post what we call wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts
where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be dif-
ferent for each applicant as well as be contingent on the number of applicants. The aim is twofold.
First, it is to investigate the extent to which firms insure workers in equilibrium through the use
of wage-vacancy contracts. The second objective is to better understand the nature of competi-
tion in directed search models in both finite and infinitely large markets, where an infinitely large
market is the limit of a finite market, with a focus on finding out whether allowing firms to post
more general contracts than wage contracts (i) indeed matters for competition among firms, in
particular when markets are incomplete, and (ii) how it matters for efficiency of equilibrium.
As a first step we characterize the constrained efficient allocation, which is that chosen by a
utilitarian social planner who can design an insurance mechanism with entrepreneurs so that they
can help him insure workers against the randomness in the number of realized matches, just like
entrepreneurs can insure workers through firms in a market equilibrium.5 Since workers are risk-
averse the constrained efficient allocation is, not surprisingly, such that workers are fully insured.
That is, each worker receives the same payment regardless of the number of other workers who
have applied to the same firm as him, and regardless of the realized number of matches. More
interestingly, this payment is exactly equal to a worker’s expected marginal product in the limit
market (given the efficient ratio of workers to firms), and in finite markets if we ignore the
constraint that the number of active firms has to be an integer. Moreover, the constrained efficient
number of active firms is such that the marginal gains of setting up a firm equals the marginal
cost, where, importantly, the marginal gains take into account the externality imposed by the
marginal firm on other firms by reducing the probability with which these other firms receive
applicants.
We then turn our attention to the characterization of equilibrium. We first consider equilibria
of the directed search game. Our first main result is that although an equilibrium of the applica-
tion subgame always exists, it might not be unique because allowing for wage-vacancy contracts
permits the expected utility of applying to a firm to be non-monotonic in the number of ap-
plicants. In fact, we show that if firms’ posting strategy profile satisfies a Monotonic Expected
Utility (MEU) property, that is, firms’ posting profile is such that either (i) the expected utility of
having applied to each firm is increasing in the number of applicants or (ii) the expected utility
of having applied to each firm is decreasing in the number of applicants for all firms, then the
equilibrium of the application subgame is unique. The MEU property is trivially satisfied with
wage contracts, but can be violated with wage-vacancy contracts.
Our second main result dealing with the characterization of equilibrium is that there is a
unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the directed search game where firms’
posting profile satisfies the MEU property, and this equilibrium is such that firms post contracts
that guarantee employment to all applicants at a fixed wage, contracts we call Full Insurance
Contracts (FIC), and the wage received by workers is equal to their expected marginal product.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to rule out nor find a general characterization of SPNE
where firms’ posting profiles do not satisfy the MEU property. The difficulty in dealing with
such posting profiles lies in the fact that uniqueness of the application subgame is not guaranteed,
making it difficult to prove that a firm’s posting profile which is not an FIC is strictly dominated.
4 A recent exception is Geromichalos [13].
5 We are interested in the constrained efficient allocation because we are interested in the allocation that a social planner
would choose when he faces choices and constraints similar to those faced by agents in a market equilibrium.
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However, posting strategy profiles that satisfy the MEU property are the only ones where all firms
post contracts such that the expected utility of having applied to a firm is non-increasing in the
number of other applicants. Since we consider such posting profiles to be the most reasonable,
we take this as a minor setback.
Finally, we consider the decision of entrepreneurs to set up firms. We focus our attention on
equilibria where for the equilibrium number of active firms the posting profile of active firms
satisfies the MEU property. Our third main result is that there exists such an equilibrium, which
we call the FIC equilibrium, where for all possible numbers of active firms the FIC SPNE is
played in the second stage game. The allocation of the FIC equilibrium corresponds to the con-
strained efficient allocation. This is because in this case workers get paid their expected marginal
product, and thus firms receive their expected marginal contribution, which leads to the correct
number of firms being set up. There may be other constrained efficient equilibria because of the
possibility of multiplicity of SPNE of the directed search game (which itself is due to the possi-
bility of multiplicity of equilibria in the application subgame). But if the number of active firms
in these other equilibria corresponds to that the planner would choose, then their outcome is the
same as in the FIC equilibrium, and thus the allocation in these equilibria is also constrained
efficient.
We then compare the equilibrium outcome of the FIC equilibrium of our model to that of stan-
dard directed search models when firms are restricted to posting wage contracts. We show that
FICs matter not only in insuring workers against unemployment risk, they also matter in terms of
how they affect competition among firms and welfare. In particular, the allocation in the standard
wage contract symmetric equilibrium in finite markets is never constrained efficient, even when
workers are risk-neutral. This is because in finite markets firms hold some monopolistic power,
and therefore wages are too low because workers get paid less than their expected marginal
product, which implies active firms make too much profit (they receive more than their expected
marginal contribution), and thus there are too many active firms. The existence of firms’ mo-
nopolistic power stems from the existence of coordination frictions: if a firm decreases its wage
it makes itself less attractive, so workers reduce the probability with which they apply, which
means they increase the probability they apply to other firms, thereby decreasing the probability
of employment at other firms. Hence, a firm’s contract posting has an impact on the expected
utility of applying to other firms. As a market becomes large this monopolistic power becomes
smaller, and the symmetric wage contract equilibrium allocation converges to the constrained ef-
ficient allocation when workers are risk-neutral. This does not hold, however, when workers are
risk-averse because when firms are restricted to posting wage contracts they cannot fully insure
workers. The consequence of this restriction is that expected wages are lower: the probability
with which risk-averse workers apply to a firm is less responsive to a reduction in the wage a
firm offers than for risk-neutral workers, because risk-averse workers are more willing to accept
a reduction in the wage in exchange for a greater probability of employment; but in equilibrium
all firms exploit this trade-off, so the probability of employment stays the same and only the
wage changes.
In contrast, when firms post FICs firms do not hold any monopolistic power, even in finite
economies. This is because in this case each firm offers a fixed level of utility to workers, im-
plying that firms face a perfectly elastic labor supply, which forces firms to pay workers their
expected marginal product, leading to efficiency, even in finite economies.
Our paper is related to a wide range of work. First, it is related to the literature on de-
centralized trade investigating the choice of mechanism by firms (sellers), either in a random
search (Camera and Delacroix [6]), directed search (McAfee [20]; Peters [25]; Coles and Eeck-
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hout [7,8]; Virág [31]; and Geromichalos [13]), or competitive search framework (Hawkins [15];
Michelacci and Suarez [21]; Eeckhout and Kircher [9]). All these papers share the assump-
tion that the utility function of workers (buyers) is linear in the wage (price) they receive
(pay).
Acemog˘lu and Shimer [1] also consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers. But
their focus differs from ours because they look at the role of unemployment insurance in a world
where firms are restricted to posting wage contracts. And like in the implicit contract literature
(Baily [4]; Azariadis [3]; Polemarchakis [27]; Akerlof and Miyazaki [2]) we are interested in
the extent to which risk-neutral firms insure risk-averse workers. Moreover, we consider in detail
the impact that general wage-vacancy contracts can have on competition among firms in both
finite and limit markets, an aspect which is absent in Acemog˘lu and Shimer [1] and the implicit
contract literature.
Our results on competition in finite markets with coordination frictions are complementary to
those of Galenianos et al. [12].6 They also study competition in a directed search framework in
finite markets, but they consider only wage contracts and the case where both workers and firms
are risk-neutral, and in their paper workers are heterogeneous whereas we focus solely on the
case where agents are homogeneous.
We discuss in more detail the connection of our paper to the literature in Section 7.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in the next section, and we char-
acterize the constrained efficient allocation in Section 3. Characterization of equilibrium of the
directed search game is undertaken in Section 4, while Section 5 deals with entry and the equi-
librium of the whole game. The welfare implications of wage-vacancy contracts and their impact
on competition are studied in Section 6. Section 7 discusses some related literature. Section 8
discusses briefly some assumptions and concludes. All proofs that are not in the main text are,
unless indicated otherwise, in Appendix A.
2. The model
2.1. Setup
There are N identical risk-averse workers indexed by n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, N  2, and a large
number M of profit maximizing and risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur can set up
one firm at a cost c ∈ (0,1). Active firms are indexed by m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, where M M denotes
the number of firms set up by entrepreneurs.
Each active firm has one productive job, which when filled yields an output of one, and if
the job is unfilled the firm is idle and nothing is produced. An active firm m posts a contract
wm = (wr,km )N,Nr=1,j=1, where wr,km is the wage paid to the r th worker (in the queue) when k workers
have applied to firm m. For completeness, we assume that wr,km = 0 for all r > k, all k. We restrict
ourselves to non-negative wages. When firm m posts the wage contract wm and k  1 workers
have applied, its profit is
πk(wm) = 1 −Wk(wm), (1)
6 The two sets of results were developed independently.
N.L. Jacquet, S. Tan / Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1064–1104 1069
where Wk(wm) ≡∑kr=1 wr,km is the wage bill. It is assumed that entrepreneurs have endowments
large enough to ignore bankruptcy issues arising from negative ex post net profit due to a large
realized wage bill.7
When a worker is employed at wage w his utility is u(w), where u is strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable with u(0) = 0.8 We assume that workers
do not have access to contingent markets to insure themselves, for instance, because of an un-
specified moral hazard problem or a lack of commitment issue. We also assume that workers do
not value leisure and that there is no unemployment insurance benefit so that the utility of being
unemployed is 0.9 We assume, for simplicity, that when facing the choice of being employed at
wage zero or being unemployed, two options that yield the same payoff, a worker chooses to
work.
In the first stage, which we call the entry game, entrepreneurs are chosen at random in a
sequential fashion to create firms, and each entrepreneur is offered the opportunity to start a firm
once.10 It will become clear later why the decision to start firms is designed in this sequential way.
The second stage is a standard directed search game where each worker can make one appli-
cation. This stage is itself a two-stage game. First, there is the contract-posting game: active firms
first simultaneously decide the contract they each want to post, and this announcement, which
firms are committed to, is publicly observable. Once workers have observed the postings of all
firms, the application subgame is played: workers choose which firm(s) to apply to, possibly with
mixed strategies, and firms which receive one or more applicant choose a worker to produce.
We follow the literature in assuming that (i) workers are anonymous to firms, (ii) firms are
anonymous to workers, and (iii) workers use identical strategies. Assumption (i) means that each
firm treats workers identically (since all workers are identical), and if k  2 workers apply to a
firm the firm randomly picks one of the workers to produce. By (ii) we mean that if two firms offer
payoff-equivalent contracts, in that a worker’s expected utility in having applied to each of these
firms is the same for any number k of other applicants, then the worker treats these two firms the
same way and applies to each of them with the same probability. In particular, this implies that
if two firms post the same contract they will be applied to by a worker with the same probability.
Note that this latter case corresponds to the usual anonymity assumption made in directed search
models. We need a stronger anonymity assumption because we allow for more general contracts
and in our paper firms can offer different contracts which are nevertheless payoff equivalent.11
7 Holmstrom [16] makes the same assumption in an implicit contract model. Another way to motivate the lack of
bounds on firms’ wage bill is to introduce an insurance market where firms can insure themselves against outcomes
where their wage bill exceeds 1. We discuss the implications of dropping this assumption in Section 8.
8 This can be understood in two ways. Either workers do not have any resources available initially, or they have
some level of wealth A, in which case the utility function u can be seen as a transformation of a function v such that
u(w) = v(w +A), where v(A) has been normalized to zero.
9 We discuss this assumption further in Section 8.
10 It is possible to allow entrepreneurs to have more than one chance to set up a firm at a unit cost c. Both formulations
turn out to be equivalent, but the current formulation is slightly easier to work with.
11 For instance, it is possible for two firms m and j to post two different contracts wm and wj , respectively, such
that [∑kr=1 u(wr,km )]/(k + 1) = [∑kr=1 u(wr,kj )]/(k + 1) = uk for all k. This is not possible in standard directed search
models for the simple reason that firms are restricted to posting one wage w for one vacancy and therefore the expected
utility of having applied to a firm when k other workers have applied is u(w)/(k + 1). Hence, if two firms offer payoff-
equivalent contracts, then they must be posting the same wage. We show in Appendix C that the type of application
strategies implied by the anonymity assumption are the only equilibrium strategies for the application subgame that are
robust to the introduction of a small perturbation to the game, suggesting that these are the most reasonable strategies.
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Assumption (iii) rules out any form of coordination of workers in their application strategies,
which might seem restrictive. However, since our goal is to study general contracts in large finite
markets, as well as limit markets, the restriction to identical, or symmetric, visit strategies seems
natural. Moreover, as argued by Peters [26], symmetric equilibria “have the nice property that
they can be interpreted as equilibria in which buyers (workers) choose best replies to the average
behavior of the other buyers (workers) in the market (and in which buyers (workers) guess this
average correctly).”
In standard directed search models, e.g., Burdett et al. [5], firms are assumed to post one
vacancy and should more than one worker show up they hire only one worker at the wage posted.
In our model firms are not restricted to paying at most one worker (posting one vacancy); in fact,
firms can agree to make side payments to more than one worker in the event they show up, even
though firms only have one productive job to fill. One way to interpret this is that firms are paying
workers who have shown up for having applied.12 Another way to think of it is to associate a
vacancy with the promise of a payment by the firm. Since firms can make side payments to more
than one person, the firm is effectively posting more than one vacancy, so firms are allowed
to hire more than one worker, but those workers who are not productive are being “hoarded.”
In the latter interpretation, firms compete with each other not only based on the wage paid to
the worker who filled that productive job, but also on the number of vacancies posted. For this
reason we term these contracts wage-vacancy contracts, whereas the contracts the literature has
been focusing on are termed wage contracts.
2.2. Definition of equilibrium
Denote by W = {(wr,k)N,Nr=1,k=1 | wr,k ∈ [0,1] and wr,k = 0 for all r > k} the set of wage-
vacancy contracts. Let θim be the probability with which workers apply to firm m and let wim be
the posting of firm m, when there are i active firms. We then have the following definition.
Definition 1. Given a number of active firms i, a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
of the directed search game is a strategy profile σ i ≡ (wi , θ i ), where wi ≡ (wim)im=1 and θ i ≡
(θ im)
i
m=1, such that:
(i) given wi , θ i is a Nash equilibrium in the application subgame; and
(ii) given θ i in the application subgame, with θim(wk) : W i → Si as given in (i), wi is a Nash
equilibrium in the contract-posting game, where Si is the i-dimensional simplex.
This definition takes as given the number of workers and the number of active firms in defin-
ing equilibrium in the directed search game, and is standard. This is only part of the definition of
equilibrium of the whole game because we still have to consider the decision of entrepreneurs to
set up a firm in the first stage. In general in directed search models, entry is only dealt with in in-
finitely large markets, but in our paper we also look at markets with finite numbers of agents. For
this reason our definition explicitly takes into account the strategic interaction in entrepreneurs’
decision to set up a firm. We denote by e = {em}Mm=1 the entry strategy profiles of entrepreneurs,
where em is the decision of the mth entrepreneur drawn to get a chance to set up a firm, and we
12 This interpretation is similar in spirit to that of Faig and Huangfu [10] who assume in a competitive search model of
money that marketmakers can pay some agents to come to their submarket.
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let M(e) be the resulting number of active firms. Assuming that an entrepreneur who is indif-
ferent between setting up a firm and not always sets up a firm, we have that em ∈ {0,1}, where
1 indicates the decision to set up a firm and 0 the decision not to set up a firm, and therefore
M(e) =∑Mm=1 em. Finally, let ΠN,i(wim;σ i−m) be the expected profit of firm m when there are i
active firms, its posting strategy is wim and the strategy profile of other firms and workers is σ i−m.
Definition 2. An equilibrium is an entry strategy e and a strategy profile for the second stage
game σ = (σ i )Mi=1 such that:
(i) given σ = (σ i )Mi=1 and e−m,
em =
{1, if mM(e);
0, if m>M(e),
where M(e) is such that for all mM(e), ΠN,M(e)(wM(e)m ;σM(e)−m ) c and for all i >M(e),
ΠN,i(w
i
m;σ i−m) < c for some m ∈ {1, . . . , i}; and
(ii) for all i, σ i is an SPNE of the second stage game as given in Definition 1.
Condition (i) says that given the subgame perfect equilibria expected to be played for each
possible number of active firms, the equilibrium number of active firms must be such that all
active firms make non-negative expected profit, net of the setup cost c, and if one or more firms
were to become active, then at least one of these active firms would be making strictly negative
expected profit. And the M(e) active firms are set up by the M(e) first entrepreneurs to be drawn
to set up a firm. This is a natural condition for in equilibrium entrepreneurs who set up firms
make non-negative expected net profit: those who make strictly positive expected net profit are
strictly better off setting up a firm, while those who will make zero expected net profit (given the
SPNE in the directed search game) are indifferent, but our tie breaking rule means they choose
to set up shop.
3. Social planner’s problem
The objective of this section is to derive an appropriate benchmark to assess the efficiency of
an equilibrium allocation. We consider the problem of a social planner whose aim is to maximize
the sum of expected utilities of all workers, and who faces choices and restrictions similar to those
faced by agents in a market equilibrium. We impose the restriction that all firms and workers
are in one marketplace.13 We also impose the restriction that workers are anonymous to the
social planner, and therefore he can only instruct workers to use identical strategies and instruct
each firm which receives more than one application to pick an applicant at random to produce.
The social planner chooses the number of active firms M , the application strategies of workers
θ ≡ (θm)Mm=1, where θm is the probability with which workers apply to firm m, and the split of
output among workers.
In addition, when markets are finite the number of productive matches is a random vari-
able, and we thus assume that the social planner can design a mechanism whereby entrepreneurs
13 It turns out that the endogenous matching function exhibits decreasing returns to scale for finite markets, so this
restriction has to be binding, for otherwise the planner can get around the coordination frictions.
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insure the social planner against the randomness in the number of productive matches. An insur-
ance mechanism is a schedule of transfers Φ = (φk)min{N,M}k=1 , φk ∈ R, from the entrepreneurs to
the social planner contingent on the realized number of productive matches k, where a negative
transfer means the social planner transfers resources to the entrepreneurs. Naturally we assume
that the mechanism designed by the social planner must be such that entrepreneurs willingly par-
ticipate, and therefore they make non-negative expected profit from participating in the insurance
scheme.
More concretely, given that there are N workers, given that the social planner has decided
M firms will be active, and given the application strategy θ he has instructed workers to follow,
one can compute the distribution of the number of matches and denote its pdf by fN,M(θ) =
{f kN,M(θ)}min{N,M}k=1 , where k denotes the number of productive matches. For entrepreneurs to be
willing to participate, an insurance mechanism Φ must be such that
min{N,M}∑
k=1
φkf
k
N,M(θ) 0. (2)
Before going any further it is clear that given a number of active firms, an application strategy,
and an insurance scheme, the social planner’s optimal decision is to split the product available to
him equally among all workers for each possible realized number of matches k due to the strict
concavity of the workers’ utility function. Hence, the social planner’s problem is to choose M ,
θ , and Φ to maximize
min{N,M}∑
k=1
u
(
k + φk −Mc
N
)
f kN,M(θ), (3)
such that condition (2) holds. Denoting by QN,M(θ) the expected number of productive matches,
i.e., QN,M(θ) =∑min{N,M}k=1 kf kN,M(θ), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For a given number of active firms M , the constrained efficient allocation is such
that:
(i) θ = (θm)Mm=1 is such that θ1 = · · · = θM = 1/M ;
(ii) Φ = (φk)min{N,M}k=1 is such that k + φk = QN,M(1/M) for all k; and
(iii) all workers receive qN,M(1/M)/N for all realized number of matches k, where qN,M(θ) ≡
QN,M(θ)−Mc.
This lemma is intuitive. Since workers are risk-averse, the social planner chooses to design
a mechanism that guarantees workers are fully insured by entrepreneurs against the randomness
in the realized number of productive matches (part (iii)). And the mechanism the social planner
chooses is such that entrepreneurs are indifferent between participating or not, for it maximizes
workers’ payoff (part (ii)). Finally, the symmetric application strategy that maximizes the ex-
pected number of productive matches is such that workers apply to all firms with the same
probability because it is the application strategy that minimizes the expected number of firms
receiving more than one application (part (i)).
When workers apply to all firms with probability 1/M , each firm receives at least one ap-
plicant with probability 1 − (1 − 1/M)N . The expected number of firms receiving at least one
applicant, given that there are M firms and all are applied to with probability 1/M , is
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QN,M(1/M) = M
[
1 − (1 − 1/M)N ].
The social planner therefore chooses M to maximize
qN,M(1/M) = M
[
1 − (1 − 1/M)N ]−Mc. (4)
Ignoring the fact that M must be an integer for the time being, (4) implies the social planner’s
choice of M satisfies14
1 − (1 − 1/M)N − (N/M)× (1 − 1/M)N−1 = c. (5)
The left-hand side of (5) is strictly decreasing in M , and therefore there is a unique solution Me
to (5). Combining (5) with (4), we obtain that each worker receives
qN,M(1/M)
N
= (1 − 1/M)N−1,
which is a worker’s expected marginal product given that all other workers apply to each firm
with probability 1/M : when a worker applies to a firm, with probability 1 − (1 − 1/M)N−1 at
least one of the N − 1 other workers has applied to that same firm, which means the firm is able
to produce without the extra worker, and therefore his marginal product is 0; but with probability
(1 − 1/M)N−1 no other worker has applied to the firm, in which case the worker’s marginal
product is 1.
Expression (5) also has a nice economic interpretation. When an extra firm is set up this firm
has two effects. On one hand if the firm has at least one worker applying to it, which happens
with probability 1 − (1 − 1/M)N , it increases output by 1. On the other hand, it also imposes
an externality on other firms by reducing the probability with which these other firms receive
applicants: with M active firms the expected queue length at each firm is N/M , so the last firm set
up also expects to receive N/M workers; since each of these workers’ expected marginal product
at other firms is (1 − 1/M)N−1, the total externality imposed on other firms through reduced
expected output is (N/M)× (1 − 1/M)N−1. The social planner internalizes this externality and
chooses the number of active firms so that the net gain from the entry of the marginal firm exactly
equals the marginal entry cost c.
Generically Me is not an integer, and the social planner’s optimal choice of M will be either
int(Me) or int(Me) + 1, where int(x) denotes the integer part of the real x. It is not difficult to
solve the planner’s choice of M restricting M to be an integer, and one would obtain that the
transfer workers receive from the planner is not equal to his expected marginal product. How-
ever, this restriction of M being integer-valued just makes subsequent analysis more complicated
without adding much meaningful economic content. So in the main part of this paper we ignore
the constraint that the number of firms in the model has to be integer-valued and relegate the
analysis when the number of firms is integer-valued to Appendix D.
In the limit market, taking the limit of the net output per worker qN,M(1/M)/N as N and M
go to infinity at a ratio of workers to firms b, we obtain that the social planner’s problem is
max
b
1 − e−b − c
b
,
14 qN,M(1/M) is strictly concave, and therefore the FOC is necessary and sufficient.
1074 N.L. Jacquet, S. Tan / Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1064–1104
where (1 − e−b)/b is the expected number of matches per worker, and c/b is the cost of creating
1/b firms per worker. The social planner’s choice of b, be, therefore solves15
1 − e−b − be−b = c, (6)
which also implies that each worker receives his expected marginal product e−be from the social
planner. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The constrained efficient allocation is such that:
(i) workers apply to all active firms with the same probability;
(ii) all workers receive the same transfer, which is their expected marginal product; and
(iii) in the finite market the social planner’s choice of the number of active firms Me solves (5),
whereas in the limit market the ratio of workers to firms be solves (6). The social planner’s
choice takes into account the externality imposed by the marginal firm on other firms by
reducing the probability with which these other firms receive applicants.
4. The directed search game
We solve the model by backward induction. We first solve the directed search game where the
numbers of workers and firms are taken as given.
4.1. The application subgame
Let us consider the problem of a worker when there are N workers and M firms, N and M
finite and no less than 2.16 When firms’ posting strategy profile is w, and given that all other
workers’ application strategy profile is θ = (θ1, . . . , θM), the expected utility of a worker in
applying to firm m is
Um(wm; θm) =
N−1∑
k=0
pkN−1(θm)u
e
(
wk+1m
)
, (7)
where pkN−1(θm) = CkN−1θkm(1 − θm)N−k−1 is the probability that k of the N − 1 other workers
turn up at firm m given that all other workers apply to this firm with probability θm, and
ue
(
wk+1m
)= 1
k + 1
k+1∑
r=1
u
(
wr,k+1m
) (8)
is the expected utility of having applied to firm m when k other workers have applied to that
same firm, with wk+1m denoting the vector of wages paid by the firm when k + 1 workers have
shown up.
Hence, the application strategy θ = (θ1, . . . , θM) is a Nash equilibrium in symmetric visit
strategies if and only if for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M},
15 The objective function of the social planner in the limit case is strictly increasing on [0, be), strictly concave on [0, b˜]
with b˜ > be , and it is strictly decreasing for b > be . Hence, the value of b solving the FOC is a global maximum.
16 If M = 1 the equilibrium wage is determined differently from the below analysis: the unique firm in the market does
not face any competition and will therefore offer 0 as a wage. We thus focus on the case where the cost c is such that the
equilibrium number of active firms is no less than 2.
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θm =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0, if Um(wm; θm) < Maxj =mUj (wj ; θj );
1, if Um(wm; θm) > Maxj =mUj (wj ; θj ); and
[0,1], if Um(wm; θm) = Maxj =mUj (wj ; θj ),
and
∑M
m=1 θm = 1.
Definition 3. A wage posting profile w is said to satisfy the Monotonic Expected Utility (MEU)
property if it is such that either (i) for all m, ue(wkm)  ue(wk+1m ) for all k; or (ii) for all m,
ue(wkm) ue(wk+1m ) for all k.
Definition 4. A wage posting profile w is said to satisfy the strict MEU property if it is such that
either (i) for all m, ue(wkm)  ue(wk+1m ) for all k, with strict inequality for some k; or (ii) for
all m, ue(wkm) ue(wk+1m ) for all k, with strict inequality for some k.
These properties are about the monotonicity of a worker’s expected utility of having applied
to each firm with respect to the number of applicants k. In this paper firms are allowed to post
general wage-vacancy contracts, and we have from (7) and (8) that
∂U(wm; θm)
∂θm
=
N−1∑
k=1
kpkN−1(θm)
θm
[
ue
(
wk+1m
)− ue(wkm)]. (9)
It is clear that when a wage posting satisfies the (strict) MEU property, that U(wm; θm) is
(strictly) monotonic in θm for all firms. The strict MEU property is always satisfied in standard
directed search models because when a firm m posts a wage contract that pays wm to the worker
it hires, ue(wkm) = u(wm)/k, and therefore ue(wk+1m ) − ue(wkm) < 0. But with general wage-
vacancy contracts, even the weaker MEU property need not be satisfied, which has implications
for uniqueness of the application subgame.
There is one type of contracts which is of particular interest. These contracts are such that the
firm guarantees employment to all workers and for all k, wr,k = w for all r  k. In this case the
utility of applying to the firm is u(w). We call such a contract a Full Insurance Contract, or FIC
thereafter. Note that if all firms post FICs the wage posting profile satisfies the MEU property,
but not the strict MEU property.
Proposition 2. Consider the application subgame of the directed search game with N workers
and M firms.
(i) For all contract posting profiles w a Nash equilibrium in symmetric visit strategies exists.
(ii) Furthermore, if the contract posting profile w satisfies the MEU property, then the symmetric
equilibrium is unique.
Hence, contrary to the case where firms are restricted to posting wage contracts, there can
be multiple symmetric equilibria in the application subgame when firms can post wage-vacancy
contracts. This is because with wage-vacancy contracts there are extra degrees of freedom.
If firms’ posting profile satisfies the strict MEU property, then we obtain uniqueness of the
application subgame because (i) the expected utility offered by each firm is strictly monotonic
with the probability the firm is applied to, and (ii) the expected utilities of applying to any two
firms change in opposite directions when workers reduce the probability they apply to one of
them and increase the probability they apply to the other one.
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Let us first explain why this is the case using wage contracts. When a firm m posts a wage
contract with wage wm, since ue(wkm) = u(wm)/k, the expected utility of applying to it can be
expressed as
U(wm; θm) = Ω(θm)u(wm),
where
Ω(θ) ≡
N−1∑
k=0
pkN−1(θ)
k + 1 (10)
is the probability for a worker, conditional on having applied, of being employed by a firm
when all other N − 1 workers apply to this firm with probability θ . Clearly in this case
∂Ω(θm)/∂θm < 0,17 which is intuitive since as θm increases the competition for the vacancy
posted by the firm increases, and therefore
∂U(wm; θm)
∂θm
= ∂Ω(θm)
∂θm
u(wm) < 0.
Hence, when all firms post wage contracts the firms’ posting profile satisfies the strict MEU, and
clearly conditions (i) and (ii) above are satisfied.
When firms post wage-vacancy contracts and their posting profile satisfies the strict MEU
property, then either ∂U(wm; θm)/∂θm is strictly positive for all m, or strictly negative for all m.
Intuitively from the above, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the application subgame
in such a case.
However, if, for instance, ue(wkm) = ue(wk+1m ) for all k for one firm m, but the wage profile for
all other firms w−m satisfies the strict MEU property, so that the firms’ posting profile satisfies
the MEU property but not the strict MEU property, then there is still a unique solution to the
application subgame. This is because when the probabilities of application to any two firms
change in opposite directions the change in the expected utilities of applying to these two firms
cannot be (strictly) of the same sign. And if there are two or more firms with contract postings
such that ue(wkm) = ue(wk+1m ) = um for all k for at least two firms m and j , if um > (<)uj ,
firm j (m) receives no application; and if um = uj , as we have assumed that workers apply to
both firms with the same probability, we also obtain a unique Nash equilibrium of the application
subgame.
The extra degree of freedom firms have when they can post wage-vacancy contracts implies
that firms’ contract posting profile can violate the MEU property. In such a case one can have that
when workers apply with a greater probability to a given firm, and therefore apply with lower
probability to some other firm, that the expected utilities of applying to these two firms change
in the same direction. In other words, contract posting profiles that violate the MEU property can
create some complementarity between workers’ application strategies, and this complementarity
is what leads to the possibility of multiplicity.
To see this more clearly consider an example with two firms, firms 1 and 2, and three workers.
When the two other workers apply to firm 1 with probability θ , the expected utility of worker 1
in applying to firms 1 and 2 are respectively
U1(w1; θ) = (1 − θ)2ue
(
w11
)+ 2θ(1 − θ)ue(w21)+ θ2ue(w31) and
U2(w2;1 − θ) = θ2ue
(
w12
)+ 2θ(1 − θ)ue(w22)+ (1 − θ)2ue(w32). (11)
17 The proof can be found in Lemma B.1 in Appendix B.
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When firms are restricted to posting standard wage contracts, from (11) we have
∂U1(w1; θ)
∂θ
=
(
1 − 2θ
3
)
u(w1), and
∂U2(w2; θ)
∂θ
=
(
2θ + 1
3
)
u(w2).
Clearly, ∂U1(w1; θ)/∂θ < 0 and ∂U2(w2; θ)/∂θ > 0 for all θ ∈ [0,1], and hence there is
at most one θ such that U1(w1; θ) = U2(w2; θ). If U1(w1;0) < U2(w2;1) then θ = 0, if
U1(w1;1) > U2(w2;0) then θ = 1, and otherwise θ is equal to the unique value solving
U1(w1; θ) = U2(w2; θ).
If instead we consider wage-vacancy contracts and we assume that the contract postings of
firms 1 and 2 are such that ue(w11) > u
e(w21) > u
e(w31) and u
e(w12) < u
e(w22) < u
e(w32), i.e.,
the MEU property is violated, we then have that ∂U(w1; θ1)/∂θ1 < 0 and ∂U(w2; θ2)/∂θ2 > 0,
so that ∂U(w2;1 − θ1)/∂θ1 < 0, for all θ ∈ S2. Focusing on the case where there is at least
one interior solution, workers apply to firms 1 and 2 with strictly positive probability only if
U1(w1; θ) = U2(w2;1 − θ). That is, subtracting U2(w2;1 − θ) from U1(w1; θ) as given in (11),
and assuming for simplicity that ue(w11) = ue(w32), θ must solve
θ
{[(
ue
(
w31
)− 2ue(w21))− (ue(w12)− 2ue(w22))]× θ + 2[ue(w21)− ue(w22)]}= 0.
The two solutions to this equation are θ = 0 and
θ˜ (w1,w2) = 2[u
e(w22)− ue(w21)]
[ue(w31)− ue(w12)] + 2[ue(w22)− ue(w21)]
.
If we assume further that ue(w22) > u
e(w21) and u
e(w31) > u
e(w12), then θ˜ (w1,w2) ∈ (0,1), which
shows that it is possible to have multiple symmetric equilibria for the application subgame with
general wage-vacancy contracts.18
In this example, workers’ application strategies are complementary since if workers apply to
firm 1 with a greater probability the expected utility of applying there decreases, as does the
expected utility of applying to firm 2.
4.2. A firm’s posting decision
We now turn our attention to the contract posting stage of the second stage game, taking as
given the number of active firms. When firm m chooses its posting wm given the contract posting
profile w−m, the probability with which workers apply to firm m might not be unique, and we
denote by Θ(wm;w−m) the corresponding set of application probabilities to firm m.
18 More generally, when there are M firms and N workers, the expected utility of applying to firm m is
Um(wm; θm) =
N−1∑
k=0
pkN−1(θm)ue
(
wk+1m
)
.
At an interior solution, the expected utility of applying to any two firms m and j is the same so that θ is such that
Um(wm; θm) = Uj (wj ; θj ) for all (m, j), implying that for all (m, j)
N−1∑
k=0
pkN−1(θm)ue
(
wk+1m
)= N−1∑
k=0
pkN−1(θi )ue
(
wk+1
j
)
.
Taking firm M as the reference, we have θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . ,1 −
∑M−1
m=1 θm), and therefore the vector (θ1, θ2, . . . , θM−1)
of dimension M − 1 is the solution to a system of M − 1 polynomial equations of order N − 1.
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It is clear that the composition of Wkm(wm), the wage bill of firm m when k workers have
applied, does not matter to the firm. But since workers are risk-averse, it obviously does matter
for them. We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider the directed search game with N workers and M firms. If w−m satisfies the
strict MEU property and there exists wm such that Π(wm; θ) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m),
then any contract posting by firm m which is not an FIC is a strictly dominated posting.
What this lemma says is that if the wage posting profile of all firms other than firm m satisfies
the strict MEU property, then if firm m makes initially strictly positive profit for at least one
equilibrium of the application subgame when firm m’s initial posting is not an FIC, then firm m’s
posting is a strictly dominated posting. The intuition behind this result is that if the wage posting
profile of all firms other than firm m satisfies the strict MEU property, then the expected utility of-
fered by these firms changes smoothly and monotonically with the wage, and therefore the utility,
firm m guarantees workers when it chooses to post an FIC. This in turn implies that the probabil-
ity with which workers apply to firm m moves smoothly and monotonically with the utility level
firm m guarantees workers when it chooses to post an FIC. Therefore in this case firm m can post
an FIC and choose the probability it is applied to. Since an FIC minimizes the expected wage
cost of offering a certain level of expected utility, any other type of contract is strictly dominated.
Since the wage posting profile of active firms satisfies the strict MEU property when firms
post wage contracts, we have the following corollary to Lemma 2.
Corollary 1. Consider the directed search game with N workers and M firms. The standard
symmetric wage contract SPNE is not an SPNE when firms are allowed to post wage-vacancy
contracts.
It is thus clear that restricting firms to posting wage contracts is indeed a restrictive assumption
when workers are risk-averse.
We now illustrate why posting a non-FIC might not be strictly dominated for a firm when
the contract posting profile of other firms does not satisfy the strict MEU property. We will
distinguish between two cases. The first case is when for some firm i, ue(wki ) > ue(w
k+1
i ) for
some k and ue(wk′i ) < ue(w
k′+1
i ) for some k
′
. The second case is when ue(wki ) = ue(wk+1i ) for
all k for some firm i.
In the first case, we know from the previous subsection that there might be more than one
equilibrium strategy profile for workers associated with a wage contract posting wm for firm m.
Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that when firm m posts the contract wm which is
not an FIC, it induces two possible symmetric application strategies θ and θ˜ , and assume that
θm = θ˜m. If firm m could choose one of the two application probabilities θm and θ˜m, then the firm
could for sure do better than posting wm by posting an FIC. In fact, it could post either wm or
w˜m such that U(wm; θm) = U(wm; θm) and U(w˜m; θ˜m) = U(wm; θ˜m), depending on whether it
wishes to receive applications with probability θm or θ˜m: since workers are risk-averse, FICs that
deliver the level of expected utility U(wm; θm) imply lower expected wage bills for the firm, and
therefore Π(wm | θm) > Π(wm | θm) and Π(w˜m | θ˜m) > Π(wm | θ˜m). However, given that w−m
is such that for some i, ue(wki ) > u
e(wk+1i ) for some k and ue(w
k′
i ) < u
e(wk
′+1
i ) for some k
′
,
there can also be more than one equilibrium application strategy profile associated with firm m
posting wm, for instance. Let us suppose that there are two equilibrium symmetric application
strategies θ and θ̂ in this case. Then, although we know for sure that Π(wm | θ) > Π(wm | θ),
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it is not possible to rule out that Π(wm | θ) > Π(wm | θ̂). Hence, if firm m were to change its
contract posting from wm to wm, it would gain if workers were to apply according to θ , but it
would be worse off if they were to apply according to θ̂ . And the same reasoning applies for the
contract posting w˜m.
The second case is about whether a firm’s expected profit changes smoothly with the wage it
posts when posting an FIC. When the posting profile of all firms other than m satisfies the strict
MEU property, then the probability with which firm m is applied to when it posts an FIC changes
smoothly with the wage it posts. This implies that firm m’s expected profit also changes smoothly
with the wage it posts. If, however, the posting profile of all firms other than m does not satisfy
the strict MEU property, then the probability with which firm m is applied to when it posts an
FIC need not change smoothly with the wage it posts. This implies that firm m’s expected profit
also need not change smoothly with the wage it posts.
Consider an example with two firms, 1 and 2, and two workers. It is useful to think of the
profit maximization decision of a firm as a two-step decision process: a firm first decides, given
the contract posting profile of all other firms, the optimal contract to post for each possible
application probability in the interval [0,1]; then it decides on the probability with which it
wishes to induce workers to apply.
If firm 2 posts a standard wage contract with wage w˜, it is clear that for all θ ∈ [0,1],
the application probability to firm 1, the optimal contract to post for firm 1 is an FIC with
wage w(θ; w˜) such that u(w(θ; w˜)) is equal to the expected utility of applying to firm 2, i.e.,
u(w(θ; w˜)) = θu(w˜) + 0.5(1 − θ)u(w˜) = 0.5(1 + θ)u(w˜).19 Then firm 1 chooses the optimal
application probability of workers by solving
max
θ∈[0,1]
Π1
(
w(θ; w˜); θ)= θ2 × (1 − 2w(θ; w˜))+ 2θ(1 − θ)(1 −w(θ; w˜)), (12)
and if we denote by θ∗(w˜) the optimal choice of θ given that firm 2 posts the wage contract w˜,
w(θ∗(w˜); w˜) is the best-response of firm 1 to firm 2 posting the wage contract w˜. In this case
Π1 changes smoothly with w.
However, if firm 2 posts an FIC with wage w˜ instead, then firm 1 can no longer freely control
the probability with which workers will apply if it posts an FIC as well. In fact, if firm 1 posts an
FIC with wage w, then the probability with which workers apply is
θ =
⎧⎨⎩
1, for w > w˜,
1/2, for w = w˜, and
0, otherwise.
The fact that θ does not change smoothly with w implies that firm 1’s expected profit also does
not change smoothly with w. In fact, if firm 1 chooses to post an FIC with wage w > w˜, its profit
is 1 − 2w, whereas it is zero if it chooses a wage w < w˜. If firm 1 instead posts the same FIC as
firm 2, its expected profit is then Π1 = 1/4 × (1 − 2w˜)+ 1/2 × (1 − w˜) = 3/4 − w˜. We will see
shortly in the next subsection that for this example unless w˜ is such that 1/2 is the probability of
application of workers firm 1 would choose if it could given that it posts an FIC with wage w˜,
then firm 1 is better off by posting a contract that is almost an FIC with wage w˜ than posting the
FIC with wage w˜ itself.
19 This is because for each θ ∈ [0,1] the FIC with wage w(θ; w˜) is the one that minimizes the expected wage bill given
that the firm must offer the level of expected utility 0.5(1 + θ)u(w˜).
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4.3. Equilibrium of the directed search game
In this subsection we consider equilibria of the directed search game, and we focus our at-
tention on SPNE where firms’ wage postings satisfy the MEU property. Note that in looking for
such equilibria we are not restricting firms’ strategy profile, we are only restricting our attention
to a subset of the set of possible SPNE.
Proposition 3. In a directed search game with N workers and M firms there is a unique SPNE of
the second stage game where firms’ wage postings satisfy the MEU property, and it is such that
all firms post the same FIC with wage
w∗N,M =
(
1 − 1
M
)N−1
, (13)
and workers apply to each firm with probability 1/M . We call this SPNE the FIC SPNE (of the
directed search game).
The logic of the argument is as follows.20 First, if we consider a candidate SPNE of the
directed search game where firms’ posting profile satisfies the MEU property and one firm, say
firm m, which is applied to with strictly positive probability, does not post an FIC, then this firm
has a profitable deviation. We know from Lemma 2 this is true if firms’ posting profile satisfies
the strict MEU, firm m can post an appropriate FIC. If firms’ posting profile satisfies the MEU
property but not the strict MEU property, because some firms post an FIC, if firm m deviates and
posts an FIC that offers workers the same expected utility as before, then it cannot always control
the probability with which workers apply to it. However, firm m can always post a contract which
is almost an FIC, and different from the postings of all other firms,21 and indirectly control the
probability workers apply to it.
For instance, firm m can offer a contract w˜ where all workers who apply are hired and paid
the same wage, but the wage is contingent on the number of applicants as follows:
w˜ =
{
w, such that u(w) = u(w)+ 
 if 1 worker applies;
w, such that u(w) = u(w)− δ otherwise, (14)
with 
, δ > 0. If firm m wishes that workers apply to it with some probability θ , it can choose
a pair (w,w) such that the expected utility of applying to it is u(w) for a probability of appli-
cation θ . Since in this case the probability that none of the N − 1 other workers have applied is
(1 − θ)N−1, and the probability that at least one other worker has applied is 1 − (1 − θ)N−1, im-
plying that the expected utility of applying to firm m is (1−θ)N−1u(w)+[1− (1−θ)N−1]u(w),
it can choose (w,w) such that
(1 − θ)N−1u(w)+ [1 − (1 − θ)N−1]u(w) = u(w). (15)
Firm m can choose 
 and δ such that the implied variation in the wage is small enough to imply
a level of expected profit arbitrarily close to the profit it would obtain by posting the FIC w with
wage w, thereby implying it would be making more profit than with its original posting. So in
20 We refer the reader to Appendix A for a complete proof of Proposition 3.
21 If firm m posts the same contract as some other firm then it will not be able to control the application probability of
workers.
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an SPNE of the second stage game all firms that are applied to with strictly positive probability
must be posting the same FIC.
However, the expected profit of a firm posting an FIC w with wage w and which is applied to
with probability θ is
Π(w; θ) =
N∑
k=1
pkN(θ)(1 − kw), (16)
where pkN(θ) = CkNθk(1− θ)N−k is the probability that k of the N workers turn up at the firm. In
fact, when a firm posts the FIC w with wage w and k workers show up the wage bill is Wk(wm) =
kw, implying the profit the firm makes is πk(wm) = 1 − kw. Expression (16) simplifies to22
Π(w; θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)N −Nθw.
This expression is intuitive: 1 − (1 − θ)N is the probability that at least one worker shows up,
which is also the probability that the firm gets to produce; and Nθ is the expected number of
workers who apply, so Nθw is the expected wage bill. It follows that the optimal application
probability for the firm, if it could choose it, is23
θ∗(w) = 1 −w1/(N−1).
Hence, if a firm, say firm m, is applied to with probability θ = θ∗(w) given its posting, then it has
a profitable deviation. In fact, if firm m posts a contract w˜ such that the two wages w and w satisfy
(15) for θ = θ∗(w), then the expected wage bill associated with the contract posting w˜ exceeds
the expected wage bill for w if θ = θ∗(w) because the firm needs to compensate workers for the
wage variability. But compared to posting w and being applied to with probability θ = θ∗(w),
the increase in profit obtained by being able to induce the application probability θ∗(w) exceeds
the extra wage cost created by the wage variability for a small enough variation in the two wages
w and w. It follows that if the J  M active firms that are applied to with strictly positive
probability post the same FIC with wage w such that θ∗(w) = 1/J , one of these J firms has a
profitable deviation by posting an almost-FIC as described above.
Conversely, from the above argument one can intuit that if the probability θ∗(w) that maxi-
mizes a firm’s expected profit when posting the FIC with wage w is equal to 1/J , then no firm
wants to deviate. Therefore, a firm’s best-response in this case is to post the same FIC as other
firms.
Finally, should some firms post a contract implying they are not applied to with some strictly
positive probability, so they make zero profit, while all other firms post the same FIC, we show
that a firm from the former group would have a profitable deviation by posting the same FIC as
the firms in the latter group. Hence, the unique SPNE of the second stage game where firms wage
postings satisfy the MEU property is such that all active firms post the same FIC, and workers
apply to all firms with the same probability 1/M .
22 This is because
Π(w; θ) =
N∑
k=1
pkN (θ)−w
N∑
k=1
pkN (θ)k;
and
∑N
k=1 pkN (θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)N ; and
∑N
k=1 pkN (θ)k = Nθ is the expression for the mean of a binomial distribution.
23 The profit function is strictly concave, so the FOC is necessary and sufficient.
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We would like to highlight that the FIC SPNE is such that workers get paid their expected
marginal product, just like in the constrained efficient allocation. We will show later on that
there exists an equilibrium where the SPNE of the directed search game is the FIC SPNE and
the number of active firms is efficient, i.e., it is indeed possible to decentralize the constrained
efficient allocation.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to rule out or find a general characterization of SPNE
where firms’ posting profile does not satisfy the MEU property. The difficulty in dealing with
such posting profiles lies in the fact that uniqueness of the application subgame is not guaranteed,
making it not possible, at least for us, to prove that a firm’s posting profile which is not an FIC
is strictly dominated. However, posting profiles that satisfy the MEU property are the only ones
where all firms post contracts such that the expected utility of having applied to a firm is non-
increasing in the number of other applicants. Since we consider such posting profiles to be the
most reasonable, we take this as a minor setback.
4.4. Payoffs in the FIC SPNE
4.4.1. Payoffs in the finite market case
A worker’s expected utility in the FIC SPNE is
U∗N,M = u
[(
1 − 1
M
)N−1]
. (17)
When a firm posts an FIC with wage w its expected profit is given by (16). Since in the FIC
SPNE all firms post the FIC with wage w∗N,M , one can replace w∗N,M by its expression in (13) to
obtain
Π∗N,M =
N∑
k=1
pkN
(
1
M
)[
1 − k
(
1 − 1
M
)N−1]
,
which simplifies to24
Π∗N,M = 1 −
(
1 − 1
M
)N
− N
M
(
1 − 1
M
)N−1
. (18)
It is easy to show that w∗N,M , and therefore U∗N,M , is strictly increasing in M and strictly
decreasing in N . Symmetrically, Π∗N,M is strictly increasing in N and strictly decreasing in M .
And the expected number of productive matches QN,M is strictly increasing in both M and N .
4.4.2. Payoffs in the limit market case
If we let N and M go to infinity at a ratio b, the equilibrium wage converges to
w∗∞,b ≡ lim
N→∞(1 − b/N)
N−1 = e−b.
24 This is because
N∑
k=1
pkN (1/M)
(
1 − k(1 − 1/M)N−1)= N∑
k=1
pkN (1/M)− (1 − 1/M)N−1
N∑
k=1
kpkN (1/M)
= 1 − (1 − 1/M)N − (1 − 1/M)N−1 × (N/M).
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Hence, the expected utility enjoyed by workers in (17) and the level of expected profit for firms
in (18) then converge respectively to
U∗∞,b = u
(
e−b
)
, and (19)
Π∗∞,b = 1 − e−b − be−b. (20)
One can also easily show that w∗∞,b, and therefore U∗∞,b , is strictly decreasing in b, whereas
Π∗∞,b is strictly increasing in b.
5. Entry game, equilibrium, and efficiency
Having considered the SPNE of the directed search game we now turn our attention to the en-
try game. Given that we could neither rule out nor characterize SPNE that do not satisfy the MEU
property, we focus our attention on equilibria where for the equilibrium number of active firms
the posting profile of active firms satisfies the MEU property. In other words, we consider equi-
libria where on the equilibrium path, i.e., for the equilibrium active number of firms, the SPNE
being played is such that firms’ posting profile satisfies the MEU property; but off the equilibrium
path, i.e., for a number of active firms other than the equilibrium number of active firms, firms’
posting profile might not satisfy the MEU property. We call such equilibria MEU Equilibria, or
MEUE.
Proposition 3 implies that for all MEUE all M active firms post the same FIC with wage w∗N,M
given in (13) along the equilibrium path, implying the level of expected profit of all active firms
is given by Π∗N,M in (18), which is strictly decreasing in M . Hence, the equilibrium number of
active firms in any MEUE is such that
Π∗N,M  c, (21)
for if Π∗N,M < c these firms would be making negative expected profit, which cannot be true in
equilibrium.
One particular MEUE is such that the FIC SPNE will be played in the second stage game
both on and off the equilibrium path, i.e., for all possible numbers of active firms i. We call these
equilibria FIC equilibria. Since Π∗N,M is strictly decreasing in M , it follows, ignoring the integer
constraint, that there exists a unique FIC equilibrium, and it is such that the equilibrium number
of active firms M∗ is such that
Π∗N,M∗ = c. (22)
There may also exist other MEUE because of the possibility of multiplicity which can arise
in the application subgame. In particular, there may exist other MEUE which imply the number
of active firms is M∗ (and the FIC SPNE is played along the equilibrium path, i.e., for M = M∗)
but where firms’ posting profiles do not satisfy the MEU property off the equilibrium path, i.e.,
these MEUE differ from the FIC equilibrium in the strategies played by firms and workers for
some number of active firms other than M∗.
Finally, there can also exist MEUE such that the equilibrium number of active firm is different
from M∗. These equilibria must be such that the equilibrium number of active firms is less
than M∗. This is because the fact that Π∗N,M is strictly decreasing in M also implies that M∗ is
the largest possible equilibrium number of active firms for an MEUE: Π∗N,M < c for all M >M∗,
which violates condition (21).
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Regarding efficiency of equilibrium, all MEUE whose equilibrium number of active firms
coincides with that of the FIC equilibrium are constrained efficient. In fact, combining (18) and
(22) we obtain Eq. (5) that gives the efficient number of firms Me , which, since this equation
has a unique solution, implies that M∗ = Me . And since the FIC SPNE is such that all workers
get paid their expected marginal product, the payment each worker receives is the same as in
the constrained efficient allocation. MEUE such that the equilibrium number of firms does not
coincide with M∗ are thus all inefficient despite the fact that in equilibrium all workers are
perfectly insured by firms. In these equilibria the wage received by workers is too low and the
source of inefficiency is the insufficiently low level of entry: there is too little competition among
firms for workers due to the too low number of firms competing.
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Given a number of workers N :
(i) An MEUE exists, and an MEUE is such that (a) the SPNE of the second stage game is the
FIC SPNE, and (b) the equilibrium number of active firms is M M∗ = Me solving (22).
(ii) All MEUE for which M = Me are efficient, and all other MEUE are inefficient because of
insufficient entry leading to inefficiently low wages.
In the limit market, using (20), one obtains that the ratio of workers to firms b∗ for the FIC
equilibrium in the limit market is such that
1 − e−b∗ − b∗e−b∗ = c. (23)
Expression (23) is the same as expression (6) yielding the efficient ratio of workers to firms be ,
and since this expression has a unique solution, it follows that b∗ = be. Since M∗ is the maximum
equilibrium number of active firms in an MEUE, b∗ is the minimum equilibrium ratio of workers
to firms.
6. FIC versus wage contracts: competition and efficiency
In this section we compare the equilibrium outcomes of our model for the FIC equilibrium to
that of the symmetric equilibrium in standard directed search models when firms are restricted
to posting wage contracts. We show that FICs matter not only in insuring workers against unem-
ployment risk, they also matter in terms of how they affect competition among firms, and thus
for efficiency.
6.1. Directed search game payoffs with FICs and wage contracts
In the standard directed search model where firms are restricted to posting wage contracts, in
the symmetric SPNE of the directed search game, w˜∗N,M , the wage posted by all firms is25
25 The proof is given in Lemma B.2 in Appendix B. Although it is not possible in general to obtain a closed-form
expression for the wage, if u is from the CRRA family with u(w) = w1−σ /(1 − σ), σ ∈ [0,1), we obtain that the
closed-form expression for the equilibrium wage is:
w˜∗N,M =
(1 − 1/M)N−1
ΩN,M(1/M)− ( σ (M−1)+1M−1 )θ
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
|θ=1/M
.
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w˜∗N,M =
(1 − 1/M)N−1
ΩN,M(1/M)+ΛN,M , (24)
where ΩN,M(θ) is defined earlier in (10), and
ΛN,M = −
[
γ (w˜∗N,M)
M − 1 −
1
M
]
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
> 0, (25)
with
γ (w) ≡ u(w)
w × u′(w)  1, with strict inequality for u strictly concave.
26
Thus, the expected utility of workers in the standard wage-contract equilibrium is
U˜∗N,M = ΩN,M(1/M)× u
[
(1 − 1/M)N−1
ΩN,M(1/M)+ΛN,M
]
. (26)
Comparing (26) to (17), it is clear that U∗N,M > U˜∗N,M . Moreover, firms’ expected profit in the
standard wage-contract symmetric SPNE is given by
Π˜∗N,M = 1 −
(
1 − 1
M
)N
− ΩN,M(1/M)
ΩN,M(1/M)+ΛN,M
N
M
(
1 − 1
M
)N−1
, (27)
whereas in the FIC SPNE expected profit is given by Π∗N,M in (18), and is strictly less than Π˜∗N,M .
When a firm changes its wage posting from a standard wage contract to an FIC, this firm
can lower its wage bill for the same level of expected utility offered to workers because it can
implicitly levy a risk-premium on workers’ wages. But when all firms switch from wage con-
tracts to wage-vacancy contracts, workers are guaranteed employment by all firms, which stiffens
competition for workers among firms, thereby reducing firms’ expected profit. From our above
calculations it is clear that in the present case the competition effect dominates the insurance
effect. Hence, workers are strictly better off and firms are strictly worse off, for given N and M .
Define by W˜ ∗N,M the expected wage in the standard wage-contract equilibrium, i.e., W˜ ∗N,M ≡
ΩN,M(1/M)w˜∗N,M . For all N and M finite one clearly has that W˜ ∗N,M <w∗N,M . Now fix the ratio
of workers to firms b. Then (25) can be re-expressed as27
ΛN,M =
N [γ (w˜∗N,M)− 1] + b
(N − b)b ×
N∑
k=2
pkN(1/M). (28)
26 This is because for all x  0
u(x) = u(0)+
x∫
0
u′(y) dy.
Since u(0) = 0 and for u concave u′(x) u′(y) for all y < x, with strict inequality if u is strictly concave, we have
u(x)
x∫
0
u′(x) dy = u′(x)x,
again with strict inequality if u is strictly concave.
27 Please see Lemma B.3 in Appendix B for the proof.
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When workers are risk-neutral γ (w) = 1 for all w, we have that
lim
N→∞ΛN,M =
N∑
k=2
Pk(b)× lim
N→∞
1
(N − b) = 0,
where Pk(b) is the Poisson probability e−b(bk/k!). Hence, when workers are risk-neutral the
expected wage as the market becomes arbitrarily large converges to W˜ ∗∞,b = Ω∞,bw˜∗∞,b, which
is equal to the expected marginal product e−b , where Ω∞,b = limN→∞ ΩN,N/b(b/N) and w˜∗∞,b
is the limit value of (24) in the wage contract model.
When workers are risk-averse, in which case γ (w) > 1 for all w > 0, and if we assume that
γ (w) is bounded for all w ∈ [0,1],28 we obtain from (28) that
Λ∞,b = lim
N→∞ΛN,M =
γ (w˜∗∞,b)− 1
b
×
∞∑
k=2
Pk(b),
which is strictly positive for all finite b, in which case one obtains that
W˜ ∗∞,b =
Ω∞,be−b
Ω∞,b +Λ∞,b < e
−b.
Hence, when workers are risk-averse the expected wage in the standard wage-contract equilib-
rium does not converge to the perfectly competitive wage. We summarize these results in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider a directed search game with a given number of workers and firms.
(i) The unique FIC SPNE is such that the wage posted is always equal to the expected marginal
product of a worker.
(ii) Assume γ (w) is bounded for all w ∈ [0,1] and b is finite. If firms are restricted to posting
wage contracts, (a) when workers are risk-neutral their expected wage is strictly less than
their expected marginal product but converges to it as the market becomes arbitrarily large;
and (b) when workers are risk-averse, their expected wage is always strictly less than their
expected marginal product, even in the limit market.
6.2. Competition with wage contracts and FICs
In the FIC SPNE workers are paid their expected marginal product, and in that sense the
equilibrium outcome is that of a perfectly competitive environment, whereas when firms are not
allowed to post general wage-vacancy contracts the outcome then fails in general to be perfectly
competitive. To better understand this, and thus the result in part (ii) of Lemma 3, note that29
W˜ ∗N,M ≡
w∗N,M − W˜ ∗N,M
W˜ ∗N,M
= −[1 + (γ (w˜∗N,M)− 1)M]ε(U˜/θ)∣∣θ=1/M, (29)
28 This is true for CRRA utility functions: if u(w) = w1−σ /(1 − σ), σ ∈ (0,1), then γ (w) = 1/(1 − σ) for all w,
which is bounded for a given σ . For a CARA utility function u(w) = 1 − e−σw , γ (w) = (1 − e−σw)/σwe−σw . From
the Taylor expansion e−σw = 1 − σw + σ 2w2/2 + o(w2), we have that γ (w) = [1 − σw/2 + o(w)]/[1 − σw + o(w)]
which converges to one as w goes to zero. And γ (w) is clearly bounded for all values of w ∈ (0,1].
29 Please see Lemma B.4 in Appendix B.
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where
ε(U˜/θ)|θ=1/M ≡ ε(Um/θ−m)|θ=1/M = −θ−m
Um
∂Um
∂θ−m
∣∣∣∣
θ−m=1/M
is the elasticity, at the equilibrium, of the expected utility of applying to any firm m with respect
to the probability θ−m with which workers apply to any other firm.
When workers are risk-neutral, γ (w) = 1 for all w, and therefore (29) simplifies to
W˜ ∗N,M = −ε(U˜/θ)|θ=1/M, (30)
which is positive since ∂U˜/∂θ is positive. Eq. (30) indicates that the greater ε(U˜/θ)|θ=1/M is (in
absolute value), that is, the greater the impact of a firm’s posting decision on the expected utility
of a worker in applying to other firms, the more the equilibrium expected wage will deviate from
the perfectly competitive wage. This is actually quite intuitive: when a firm posts a standard wage
contract with one vacancy and it decreases the wage it pays, the firm becomes less attractive to
workers, which implies that they apply with a lower probability. This in turn implies that workers
apply to other firms with a greater probability, thereby decreasing the expected utility of applying
to them. Hence, when a firm decreases its wage, the fall in application probability of workers,
which we can interpret as a fall in labor supply to the firm, is limited by the fact that it becomes
harder to be employed at other firms. That is, the monopoly power a firm enjoys in the presence
of coordination frictions comes from the fact that its contract posting decision also has an impact
on the expected payoff of workers in applying to other firms, and therefore has an impact on the
level of expected utility the market offers.
As Lemma 3 establishes, when workers are risk-neutral there are two instances in which firms
do not have any market power. The first instance is when firms are allowed to post general wage-
vacancy contracts, no matter what the size of the market is: all firms guarantee employment to all
workers, so that if a firm decides to change its wage, this has no impact on the expected utility of
applying to other firms since it does not depend on the probability with which workers apply. The
second instance is when firms are restricted to posting wage contracts but the market is arbitrarily
large: a firm is then too small to have any impact on the queue length at other firms, and therefore
a firm cannot have any impact on the expected utility of applying to other firms either. In either
case, a firm does not have any monopoly power because it effectively faces a completely elastic
labor supply in that the expected utility it has to offer to workers to be applied to with positive
probability is taken as exogenous since its posting does not have any impact on the expected
utility offered by the market, i.e., by other firms.
However, when workers are risk-averse and firms are restricted to posting standard wage con-
tracts, although a firm does not have any impact on the expected utility of applying to other firms
either when the market is large, the expected wage is always strictly lower than the expected
marginal product. Contrary to risk-neutral workers who are indifferent between receiving the
wage w∗∞,b for sure or receiving the wage w˜∗∞,b with probability Ω∞,b(b), risk-averse workers
also care about the variability of the payoff in applying to a given firm. Hence, risk-averse work-
ers are willing to accept a larger decrease in their wage in exchange for a given increase in the
probability of employment than risk-neutral workers would. This is because risk-averse work-
ers value the probability of being employed relative to the wage more than risk-neutral workers
do. In equilibrium this allows firms to offer workers contracts that imply an expected wage for
workers lower than their expected marginal product.
In fact, if we compare the wage w˜∗N,M when workers are risk-neutral, i.e., γ (w) = 1 for
all w, and risk-averse, i.e., γ (w) > 1, it follows from expression (28) that the wage risk-neutral
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workers receive is strictly greater than that received by risk-averse workers. One can actually
see this clearly in the case where workers’ utility function displays CRRA and the coefficient of
relative risk aversion is σ ∈ (0,1). In fact, in this case γ (w) = 1/(1 − σ) > 1 for all w, and we
have that
N [σ/(1 − σ)] + b
(N − b)b ×
N∑
k=2
pkN(1/M) >
b
(N − b)b ×
N∑
k=2
pkN(1/M),
where the left- and right-hand sides are the expressions for ΛN,M when γ (w) = 1/(1 − σ) > 1
for all w and γ (w) = 1 for all w respectively.
Note that when workers are risk-averse, even if we had Λ∞,b = 0, so that W˜ ∗∞,b = e−b , from
(26) the expected utility of workers would then converge to
U˜∗∞,b = Ω∞,b(b)u
(
e−b
Ω∞,b(b)
)
<U∗∞,b.
Although the expected wage offered by firms would in this case be equal to workers’ expected
marginal product, workers would still face the risk of unemployment, which means there is still
a variability in the payment they will receive. Hence, the existence of the risk of unemployment
itself also reduces the level of welfare for workers compared to an FIC.
6.3. Entry and efficiency with wage contracts and FICs
In the standard directed search model with wage contracts when workers are risk-neutral,
the expected wage in the symmetric SPNE converges to w∗∞,b = e−b as the market becomes
arbitrarily large, and therefore firms’ profit Π˜∗∞,b given in (27) converges to Π∗∞,b = 1 − e−b −
be−b for a given b, just like in the FIC equilibrium. And the equilibrium ratio of workers to firms
b converges to the same number as the market becomes large. Hence, the allocations for this FIC
equilibrium and the standard wage-contract symmetric equilibrium are constrained efficient.30
However, when workers are risk-averse, firms make greater expected profit in the standard
wage-contract symmetric SPNE than in the FIC SPNE with the same number of active firms,
and therefore b is always weakly lower than the efficient ratio at the limit. This is because, as
noted by Acemog˘lu and Shimer [1] and shown in detail in this paper, risk-averse workers are
willing to trade lower wages for a higher probability of employment: a lower wage rate increases
firms’ profit, which means the equilibrium number of active firms increases, thereby increasing
the probability of employment for workers.
If we consider a finite market instead, our earlier analysis clearly indicates that the standard
wage contract equilibrium allocation is not constrained efficient, even when workers are risk-
neutral. In fact, ΛN,M > 0 for all finite N and M even when γ (w) = 1, and this implies that
W˜ ∗N,M , the expected wage workers receive, is strictly lower than their expected marginal prod-
uct. Hence, there is too much entry in the wage contract symmetric equilibrium. The wedge
between the expected wage and the expected marginal product for given N and M comes from
the fact that in a finite market firms have some monopolistic power because their own posting
has an impact on the expected utility of other firms, and therefore on the market utility. As the
market becomes arbitrarily large, a firm’s ability to influence the market utility vanishes, and
30 This is because when workers are risk-neutral the social planner is indifferent about the way the product is split
among workers.
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therefore this monopolistic power disappears. This is why the equilibrium ratio of workers to
firms converges to the efficient ratio as the market becomes large.
Hence, although the standard wage contract symmetric equilibrium allocation is constrained
efficient at the limit when workers are risk-neutral, which is the case most of the literature deals
with, it is not constrained efficient in a finite market31: when firms are restricted to posting
wage contracts wages are too low (workers get paid less than their expected marginal product),
which implies active firms make too much profit (they receive more than their expected marginal
contribution), and thus there are too many active firms. The inefficiency is compounded when
workers are risk-averse because, as noted in the previous subsection, in addition to firms’ market
power, the inability of firms to fully insure workers against the risk of unemployment leads firms
to reduce the wage they offer further for given N and M .
7. Related literature
In this section we discuss in more detail some connections between our work and the existing
literature.
7.1. General mechanisms, efficiency, and indeterminacy
7.1.1. General mechanisms and efficiency
Among the work that considers the choice of mechanisms by firms (sellers) in search models
this paper is closest to the work that emphasizes the role of the mechanism posted by firms
(sellers) for efficiency of equilibrium, although none of this work considers the role of insurance
in the choice of mechanisms.
Consider Hawkins’ [15] competitive search model of the labor market with a continuum of
multi-worker firms with concave production functions. He shows that efficiency cannot be ob-
tained if firms post contracts where they commit to a wage but not to the number of workers that
will be hired. However, he shows that if firms post a wage schedule, i.e., the wage a worker is
paid is contingent on his position in the queue, then efficiency is obtained.32 Although this result
might appear to be closely related to ours, it is actually quite different and is closer to Eeckhout
and Kircher [9].
Eeckhout and Kircher [9] consider a competitive search model in a large market where a con-
tinuum of sellers compete by posting general trading mechanisms, including mechanisms where
unsuccessful buyers are compensated, although their focus is on mechanisms like price post-
ing and auctions where unsuccessful buyers are not compensated. They show that when buyers
(workers) are heterogeneous fixed-price mechanisms are not constrained efficient when second-
price auctions are allowed, because auctions allow for ex post screening of the different types,
whereas fixed-price mechanisms do not. In Hawkins [15], because firms’ production function is
concave, the marginal product of each worker in the queue is different, which is like assuming
that workers are heterogeneous ex post (once when they have applied).
In other words, more general mechanisms than wage contracts are necessary for efficiency
in Hawkins [15] and Eeckhout and Kircher [9] because of the need for firms (sellers) to screen
heterogeneous workers (buyers). In our model the reason for the inefficiency in the limit market
31 Burdett et al. [5] study both finite and limit markets but do not consider the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation.
32 He also shows that if firms can commit to hiring a given number of workers, then efficiency is obtained.
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when wage-vacancy contracts are not allowed is the unmet demand for insurance coming from
risk-averse workers, whereas in both Hawkins [15] and Eeckhout and Kircher [9] all agents
are risk-neutral, so there is no insurance motive for firms when choosing which mechanism to
post. Moreover, they consider only infinitely large markets whereas we are also interested in
competition in finite markets.
7.1.2. General mechanisms and indeterminacy
Coles and Eeckhout [8] consider a directed search model in a product market where risk-
neutral sellers can post prices contingent on the number of buyers, who are risk-neutral, who
show up. To take the simplest possible case, suppose there are 2 firms and 2 workers. They
obtain that there is a continuum of equilibria: the price that sellers charge buyers when only
one buyer shows up is uniquely pinned down, but the price that sellers charge buyers when the
two of them show up is not, and this can take a continuum of possible values.33 The intuition
for the multiplicity is that by allowing sellers to post prices contingent on the number of buyers
who apply introduces a degree of freedom which implies each seller has a continuum of best-
responses to what the other seller posts. In our model with 2 workers and 2 firms if we assume that
workers are risk-neutral, then we will also have a continuum of equilibria, just like in Coles and
Eeckhout [8]. This is because we have one more degree of freedom than they do: the wage posted
can be contingent not just on the number of workers who show up but also on their position in
the queue. However, if workers were instead risk-averse, then we know from this paper that there
will be a unique equilibrium34 where firms insure all workers. The intuition as to why having
risk-averse workers eliminates all other equilibria is that when workers are risk-averse a firm
has, generically, a unique best-response to what the other firm posts, and it is to post an FIC.35
7.2. Insurance provision
7.2.1. Search
We are not the first ones to investigate the role of insurance provision in a directed or compet-
itive search framework. As noted by Acemog˘lu and Shimer [1] and shown in detail in this paper,
risk-averse workers are willing to trade lower wages for a higher probability of employment, and
that this willingness to trade off lower wages for higher employment probability implies there is
too much entry with standard wage contracts.
Acemog˘lu and Shimer [1] consider a competitive search model with risk-averse workers, but
their focus differs from ours. They restrict firms to posting standard wage contracts and instead
investigate the impact of introducing unemployment insurance on risk-sharing, the composition
of jobs, and the level of aggregate output. They show that introducing an unemployment insur-
ance scheme can increase output, and they conjecture that an optimal unemployment insurance
scheme is such that workers who end up jobless receive a strictly positive unemployment payout,
and this payout is greater than the one which would maximize output, so the conjectured optimal
33 Geromichalos [13] obtains a similar result in a directed search model where sellers choose their production capacity,
they can charge a fee, possibly negative, to all buyers who apply to them, and charge buyers who get served a price
possibly contingent on the number of buyers served.
34 There is no multiplicity of equilibria in the application subgame because there are only 2 workers so the MEU
property is trivially satisfied.
35 If the other firm does not post an FIC, then the firm’s best response is to post an FIC; while if the other firm posts an
FIC, then either the firm’s best-response is to post an FIC or it does not have a best-response.
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unemployment insurance scheme does not maximize output. And this implies that an optimal
unemployment insurance scheme cannot achieve the efficient allocation. In this paper we ab-
stract from unemployment insurance schemes and instead investigate the role of firms in directly
insuring workers. We show that by allowing firms to post wage-vacancy contracts efficiency can
be obtained, which suggests that the design of an optimal labor market policy that aims to insure
workers against the risk of unemployment probably needs to take into account the fact that the
optimal policy can take a form different from standard unemployment insurance schemes that
only give a payout to a worker when unemployed.
7.2.2. Implicit contracts
The implicit contract literature (Baily [4]; Azariadis [3]; Polemarchakis [27]; Akerlof and
Miyazaki [2]) is also interested in risk-neutral firms insuring risk-averse workers, and similar re-
sults are obtained. In fact, early results showing that implicit contracts can create unemployment
relied on the assumption that firms could not perfectly insure workers. Once firms are allowed
to fully insure workers, then they do: as highlighted by Holmstrom [16] and Kihlstrom and Laf-
font [19] the implicit contracts offered by firms to workers can complete the markets, just like
the FICs firms post in equilibrium in our model. The way the implicit contract literature went
around this feature, which was seen as undesirable, was to introduce asymmetric information to
limit the degree of insurance. This can be done in a directed search framework as well, as Guer-
rieri et al. [14] show. An important difference between our analysis and the one carried out in
the implicit contract literature is that in implicit contract models firms do not have monopolistic
power at the time of contracting, whereas we are interested in the impact of general contracts on
competition and the ability of firms to take advantage of their monopolistic power arising from
the existing of coordination frictions.
8. Discussion and conclusion
This paper establishes that when workers are risk-averse and firms risk-neutral, the type of
contracts that the standard literature has been focusing on would not be offered if firms can post
more general wage-vacancy contracts. Moreover, we have shown that wage-vacancy contracts
have important implications for agents’ welfare, competition, and efficiency: firms can complete
the markets and pay workers the perfectly competitive wage for both finite and limit economies.
This contrasts with the symmetric equilibrium when firms are restricted to posting wage contracts
because then the equilibrium outcome converges to that of a perfectly competitive environment
if and only if workers are risk-neutral. This in turn implies that when workers are risk-averse the
entry decision of firms is constrained efficient if and only if firms are allowed to post general
wage-vacancy contracts, and with wage contracts there is too much entry.
The fact that firms offer contracts that fully insure workers in the unique MEUE is admittedly
extreme, and is not observed in labor markets. However, this result was the logical consequence
of relaxing a restrictive assumption on the type of contracts firms can post in directed search
models, and this enabled us to shed some light on the notion of competition in models with
coordination frictions.
In our paper, there are at least two other ways to restrict the extent of risk-sharing between
firms and workers: by limiting the willingness of firms to insure workers, or by limiting the will-
ingness of workers to accept a lower wage in exchange for greater job security. It was assumed
throughout the paper that firms are owned by wealthy entrepreneurs so as to ignore bankruptcy
issues. If instead we had assumed that firms must always be making non-negative profit ex post,
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the unique MEUE for large economies would no longer be an equilibrium because FICs imply
that with some positive probability firms would make negative ex post profit when too many
workers have applied. And as has been mentioned in the previous section one can introduce
asymmetric information, like in Guerrieri et al. [14], to limit the willingness of firms to insure
workers.
We also assumed that workers do not value leisure and that there is no unemployment insur-
ance (UI), so workers’ reservation wage is zero. If workers were to value leisure; to receive UI
benefits if they are unsuccessful in their application; be allowed to send multiple applications;
or if the game were a repeated game so that workers who do not secure a job at a given point in
time can look for a job later on, then workers’ reservation wage would be strictly positive.36 And
if the reservation wage of workers were to exceed the wage offered by firms in the MEUE, then
firms would no longer be able offer the same FIC.
In either case, firms would clearly still have an incentive to post contracts that insured workers,
at least partially, and therefore our model can be taken as a benchmark. We believe, for instance,
that our model can be useful in studying the design of a UI scheme that takes into account the
fact that firms themselves have an incentive to offer some insurance to workers against the risk
of unemployment because it can enable them to reduce their expected wage bill.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is in three steps. First, we show, taking as given θ and the expected
cost of a mechanism to the entrepreneurs γ , that the social planner chooses (φk)min{N,M}k=1 such
that φk + k = φ1 + 1. In fact, given θ and the expected cost of a scheme φ, the problem of a
social planner is to choose (φk)min{N,M}k=2 to maximize (3). Taking the FOC with respect to φk for
any k ∈ {2, . . . ,min{N,M}}, and using the fact that
φ1 =
φ −∑min{N,M}k=2 φkf kN,M(θ)
f 1N,M(θ)
,
yields that
− f
k
N,M(θ)
N × f 1N,M(θ)
u′
(
1 + φ1 −Mc
N
)
f 1N,M(θ)+ u′
(
k + φk −Mc
N
)
f kN,M(θ)
N
= 0,
which implies that the social planner chooses Φ such that φk + k = φ1 + 1.
Second, this then implies that the social planner chooses Φ such that k + φk = QN,M(θ) for
all k: since Φ is such that
∑min{N,M}
k=1 φkf
k
N,M(θ) = φ  0, and the social planner wants that for
all k ∈ {2, . . . ,min{N,M}}, φk + k = φ1 + 1, it follows that
min{N,M}∑
k=1
(φ1 + 1 − k)f kN,M(θ) = φ,
which simplifies to
φ1 + 1 −QN,M(θ) = φ.
36 In the first two cases the reservation wage is exogenous, whereas it is endogenous in the latter two.
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Clearly, the social planner will thus choose a mechanism which makes the entrepreneurs indif-
ferent between participating and not participating, i.e., such that φ = 0.
Finally, the optimal application strategy must be such that θ1 = · · · = θM = 1/M because this
strategy maximizes the expected number of matches. In fact,
QN,M(θ) =
M∑
m=1
[
1 − (1 − θm)N
]
,
which, given that θ1 = 1 −∑Mm=2 θm  0, can be re-expressed as
QN,M(θ) = 1 −
(
M∑
m=2
θm
)N
+
M∑
m=2
[
1 − (1 − θm)N
]
.
Taking the FOC with respect to any θm, m 2, and ignoring the constraint that θm ∈ [0,1] since
it will not be binding, yields that the optimal application strategy is such that
N(1 − θ1)N−1 = N(1 − θm)N−1, or
θ1 = θm,
which implies that θm = 1/M for all m 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) The proof of the first part of the proposition is a fixed-point problem
(it follows closely the line of argument used in the proofs of existence of a Walrasian equilibrium
in a pure exchange economy with an excess demand function). Let zm(θ) ≡ Um(wm; θm) −∑M
j=1 θjUj (wj ; θj ) be the excess expected utility of applying to firm m over the application
strategy θ , and let
Tm(θ) ≡ θm + max{0; zm(θ)}
1 +∑Mj=1 max{0; zj (θ)} .
It is clear that because Um(wm; θm) is continuous in θm for all m = 1, . . . ,M , zm(θ) is also a
continuous function of each element of θ , and therefore Tm(θ) is continuous in each element
of θ . The function T which transforms θ into (Tm(θ))Mm=1 is from SM into SM . Hence, by
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem there exists a vector θ such that T (θ) = θ , i.e., Tm(θ) = θm for
all m.
If θm = 0, it must be that Tm(θ) = 0, and therefore that zm(θ) 0.
If θm > 0, there are two cases to consider, whether the denominator is equal to or greater
than 1. If it is equal to 1, it follows that zm(θ)  0. If, however, the inverse of the denom-
inator is equal to α > 1, we then have that θm = αθm + α max{0; zm(θ)}, which is equiv-
alent to (1 − α)θmzm(θ) = α max{0; zm(θ)}zm(θ). However, ∑Mm=1 θmzm(θ) = 0. Therefore∑M
m=1(1 − α)θmzm(θ) =
∑M
m=1 α max{0; zm(θ)}zm(θ) = 0, implying that zm(θ) 0 for all m.
But since
∑M
m=1 θmzm(θ) = 0, we have that the fixed-point θ has the following properties: if
θm > 0, then zm(θ) = 0, and if θm = 0, then zm(θ) 0, which is consistent with an equilibrium
application strategy. Therefore, there exists a Nash equilibrium in symmetric strategies.
(ii) Suppose that there exist two equilibrium application strategies θ and θ˜ . Then there exist
m and j such that θ˜m > θm  0 and 0 θ˜j < θj .
When Ui(wi; θi) is strictly decreasing in θi for any firm i, this implies that Uj(wj ; θ˜j ) >
Uj (wj ; θj ). (The case where Ui(wi; θi) is strictly increasing in θi for any firm i is symmetric.)
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But since θj > 0, it must be true that Uj (wj ; θj )  Um(wm; θm). And θ˜m > θm implies that
Um(wm; θm) > Um(wm; θ˜m). In total we obtain that Uj (wj ; θ˜j ) > Um(wm; θ˜m), which contra-
dicts the fact that θ˜m > 0.
Now suppose that for all firms m = j for some j , Um(wm; θm) is strictly decreasing in θm for
any firm m, and ∂Uj (wj ; θj )/∂θj = 0 for all θj ∈ [0,1]. If θ˜j = θj = 0, then we can use the argu-
ment above to show it must be that θ = θ˜ . If either θ˜j or θj is strictly positive, we have two cases
to consider. (a) If θ and θ˜ are such that 0 θ˜m < θm and θ˜i > θi  0 for some m and i: If θj > 0,
one must have Um(wm; θ˜m) > Um(wm; θm) = Uj(wj ; θj )Ui(wi; θi) > Ui(wi; θ˜i ), contradict-
ing the fact that θ˜i > 0; and if θ˜j > 0, one must have Ui(wi; θi) > Ui(wi; θ˜i ) = Uj (wj ; θ˜j ) 
Um(wm; θ˜m) > Um(wm; θm), contradicting the fact that θm > 0. (b) If instead θ and θ˜ are such
that 0  θ˜m < θm for some m and that θ˜i = θi  0 for all i = j,m, then it must be that θ˜j >
θj  0. Since θm > 0, it must be that Uj (wj ; θ˜j ) = Uj (wj ; θj )  Um(wm; θm) < Um(wm; θ˜m),
contradicting the fact that θ˜j > 0.
If more than one firm post contracts such that ∂Um(wm; θm) = 0 for all θm ∈ [0,1], then only
the firms offering the highest expected utility are applied to in equilibrium, and therefore all other
firms with postings such that Um(wm; θm) < maxj Uj (wj ; θj ) can be ignored. Since all firms
posting these contracts are treated symmetrically by workers and are applied to with the same
probability, one can therefore follow the above argument to show uniqueness of equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove this lemma it is useful to have the following intermediate result.
Lemma A.1. Consider a market with N workers and M firms. If w−m satisfies the strict MEU
property, and if wm is such that for some k, wr,km = wp,km for some r,p  k, then there exists
another posting w˜m such that w˜r,km = w˜km for all r  k, and such that u(w˜km) = ue(wkm) for
which Π(w˜m; θ)  Π(wm; θ) for all θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m), and Π(w˜m; θ)  Π(wm; θ) for θ ∈
Θ(wm;w−m) strictly positive.
Proof. Consider a contract wm such that, given w−m, Π(wm; θ)  0 for all θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m),
with some θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m) strictly positive, and for some k, wr,km = wp,km for some r,p  k. If
instead firm m were to post the contract w˜m such that for some k, w˜r,km = w˜km for all r  k, and
such that u(w˜km) = ue(wkm), then the firm offers to the workers the same conditional expected
utility of applying for the two contracts. And by offering w˜m instead of wm it reduces its wage
bill when k workers show up to Wkm(w˜m) = kw˜km, and therefore πk(w˜m) > πk(wm). In fact, the
strict concavity of u yields
Wkm(wm)−Wkm(w˜m) =
k∑
r=1
wr,km − ku−1
[
1
k
k∑
r=1
u
(
wr,km
)]
> 0.
Furthermore, for all k, ue(w˜m) = ue(wkm), and therefore Θ(w˜m,w−m) = Θ(wm;w−m). Hence,
for all θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m) we have that, Π(w˜m; θ)Π(wm; θ), with strict inequality for all θ ∈
Θ(wm;w−m) strictly positive. 
Now suppose w−m satisfies the strict MEU property. If Θ(wm;w−m) is not a singleton, we
know from Proposition 2 the multiplicity is due to wm.
(i) If we first assume that for a given contract profile w−m there is a unique θ = θ ∈
Θ(wm;w−m) for wm which is not an FIC, then we have two cases to consider. (a) If θ = 0,
then it must be that Π(wm; θ) = 0. Since there exists some wage-vacancy contract such that
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firm m makes strictly positive profit the contract wm cannot be a best-response to the posting
profile w−m. (b) If θ > 0, then we know from Lemma A.1 that a firm will not choose a wage
contract for which the wage offered varies with the position of a worker in the line. Moreover,
we can use the same line of argument as used in the proof of Lemma A.1 to show that the firm
can reduce its wage bill for a given level of expected utility promised to the workers by posting
instead an FIC w˜m with wage w˜m such that u(w˜m) = U(wm; θ) =∑N−1k=0 pkN−1(θ)uem(wkm). In
fact, we know from Lemma 1 that a firm’s optimal contract is such that all workers who have
applied to the firm must be paid the same wage, i.e., wr,km = wkm for all r  k, all k. Hence, the
expected wage bill in this case is
W(w˜m) =
N∑
k=1
pkN(θ)kw˜m =
N∑
k=1
pkN(θ)ku
−1
[
N∑
k=1
pkN(θ)u
e
m
(
wkm
)]
,
where uem(wkm) = u(wkm). However,
N∑
k=1
pkN(θ)ku
−1
[
N∑
k=1
pkN(θ)u
(
wkm
)]
<
N∑
k=1
pkN(θ)kw
k
m
for all wm such that wkm = wk′m for some k, k′. Hence, for all wm such that wkm = wk′m for some k, k′
and FIC w˜m with wage w˜m such that um(w˜m) = ∑N−1k=0 pkN−1(θ)uem(wkm), W(w˜m) < W(wm)
implying that Π(w˜m; θ) >Π(wm; θ).
(ii) If Θ(wm;w−m) is not a singleton, firm m can choose to post the FIC w˜m with wage w˜m
associated with the application probability θ˜ where
θ˜ = arg max
θ∈Θ(wm;w−m)
Π
(
w˜θm; θ
)
,
where for each θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m) w˜θm is the FIC with wage w˜θm such that um(w˜θm) =∑N−1
k=0 pkN−1(θ)uem(wkm). In fact, given the properties of w−m, by posting an FIC firm m in-
duces a unique equilibrium of the application subgame. And for each FIC posting w˜θm asso-
ciated with each application probability θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m), we have that ∑Nk=1 pk(θ)kw˜θm <∑N
k=1 pk(θ)(
∑k
r=1 w
r,k
m ). Denoting by θ˜ the θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m) corresponding to the FIC w˜m
we have that for all wm which is not an FIC, there exists an FIC w˜m with wage w˜m such
that um(w˜m) =∑N−1k=0 pkN−1(θ˜)uem(wkm), and Π(w˜m; θ˜ ) > Π(wm; θ) for all θ ∈ Θ(wm;w−m).
Hence, if Π(wm; θ) > 0 then Π(w˜m; θ˜ ) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is done in three steps. We first show that in an SPNE that
satisfies the MEU property, if a firm is applied to with some strictly positive probability in equi-
librium, then it must be posting an FIC. We then show that if all firms post the same FIC with
wage w = w∗N,M (firms are all applied to with the same probability 1/M), then firms have a
profitable deviation, and if all firms post the same FIC with wage w∗N,M then firms do not have
a profitable deviation. We finally show that if a subset of the active firms, those applied to with
strictly positive probability, post the same FIC, and the rest of the firms post arbitrary contracts
but are not applied to, then a firm from the latter group has a profitable deviation.
Step 1. In this first step we show that in an SPNE that satisfies the MEU property, if a firm is
applied to with some strictly positive probability in equilibrium, then it must be posting an FIC.
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The proof of this first step is done by contradiction. Consider a candidate SPNE where the firms’
posting profile satisfies the MEU property, and where a firm m, which is applied to by workers
with some probability θ > 0, posts a non-FIC wm. Denote by Π(wm; θ) 0 the expected profit
this firm makes and by U = Um(wm; θ) the expected utility of applying to this firm in this
candidate equilibrium. Clearly firm m would make greater profit if it were to post the FIC w with
wage w such that w = u−1(U) and were still applied to with probability θ . But firm m might, by
changing its posting to w, trigger a change in the application probability of workers, for instance
because another firm is posting w. Hence, posting this FIC might not necessarily be profitable
for firm m. However, it can post what we call an almost-FIC replicating w, which can enable it to
indirectly choose the application probability of workers, thereby guaranteeing for itself a greater
profit. In fact, firm m can post a contract w˜ as given in (14) with U = u(w) and such that no
other firm posts the same contract.37 
 and δ must therefore be such that
(1 − θ)N−1[u(w)+ 
]+ (1 − (1 − θ)N−1)[u(w)− δ]= u(w),
so choose δ equal to
δ(
; θ) = (1 − θ)
N−1
1 − (1 − θ)N−1 
. (A.1)
This implies that the extra cost of this almost-FIC compared to the FIC w is
C(θ; 
) = Nθ(1 − θ)N−1{u−1[u(w)+ 
]−w}
+Nθ(1 − (1 − θ)N−1){u−1[u(w)− δ(
; θ)]−w}. (A.2)
For any > 0 one can find an 
(θ;) > 0 such that C(θ;) <: choose

(θ;) = u
[
u(w)+ 
Nθ(1 − θ)N−1
]
− u(w). (A.3)
We then have
C(θ; 
) = +Nθ(1 − (1 − θ)N−1){u−1[u(w)− δ(
; θ)]−w}<,
since u−1
[
u(w)− δ(
; θ)]−w < 0.
Hence, if initially firms’ expected profit is Π(wm; θ), which is strictly less than the profits from
posting the FIC w Π(w; θ), then we can find 
(θ;) > 0 as given in (A.3) such that
Π(w; θ)−C(θ; 
) >Π(wm; θ) 0,
i.e., the expected profit of posting the almost-FIC is greater than posting the non-FIC wm.
This implies that all firms being applied to with strictly positive probability in equilibrium
are an FIC, which then implies that all firms being applied to with strictly positive probability in
equilibrium are posting the same FIC. There are therefore two possible types of equilibria: either
all firms post the same FIC and are applied to with strictly positive probability; or a subset of the
firms, those applied to with strictly positive probability, post the same FIC, and the rest of firms
post arbitrary contracts but are not applied to in equilibrium.
37 If another firm posts the same almost-FIC contract then firm m does not control the application probability of workers.
Since there are a finite number of firms, or a countable number when the number of firms is infinity, it is always possible
to find an almost-FIC that no other firm is posting.
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Step 2. In this second step we show that if all firms post the same FIC with wage w = w∗N,M
(firms are all applied to with the same probability 1/M), then firms have a profitable deviation,
and if all firms post the same FIC with wage w∗N,M then firms do not have a profitable deviation.
A firm’s expected profit if it posts the FIC w with wage w and it could choose the probability
θ with which workers will apply, is
Π(w; θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)N −Nθw, with
∂Π(w; θ)
∂θ
= N(1 − θ)N−1 −Nw, and
∂2Π(w; θ)
∂θ2
= −N(N − 1)(1 − θ)N−2 < 0 for N > 2.
Hence, given that other firms post w, if a firm could choose the probability with which workers
apply, it would choose
θ∗(w) = 1 −w1/(N−1).
In fact, if the firm chooses θ = 0 then it makes zero expected profit; if it chooses θ = 1 then
it needs to post a wage strictly greater than w, which then implies its profit is strictly less than
1 −Nw, whereas if it chooses θ∗(w) then its profit is
Π
(
w; θ∗(w))= 1 −Nw + (N − 1)wN/(N−1) > 1 −Nw.
It means that if the candidate equilibrium is such that one of the M firms is not applied to with
probability θ∗(w), then this firm has a profitable deviation by posting an almost-FIC with wage
as in (14): choose δ equal to
δ
(

; θ∗(w))= (1 − θ∗(w))N−1
1 − (1 − θ∗(w))N−1 

and 
 equal to


(
θ∗(w);)= u[u(w)+ 
Nθ∗(w)(1 − θ∗(w))N−1
]
− u(w).
In fact, firm m is applied to with probability θ = θ∗(w), implying its expected profit is initially
Π(w; θ) and by posting an almost-FIC as described above its expected profit is
Π
(
w; θ∗(w))−C(θ∗(w); 
)>Π(w; θm) 0,
where C(θ; 
) is given by (14); that is, the expected profit of posting the almost-FIC as given by
(14) is greater than posting the FIC w.
However, since θ∗(w) = 1 −w1/(N−1), θ∗(w) = 1/M if and only if
w = w∗N,M.
Hence, if w = w∗N,M all firms have a profitable deviation. And if w = w∗N,M no firm has a
profitable deviation.
Step 3. In this last step we rule out posting profiles such that a subset of the firms, those applied
to with strictly positive probability, post the same FIC w, and the rest of the firms post arbitrary
contracts but are not applied to. First, we know from Step 2 that it must be that all J firms that
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are applied to with strictly positive probability are applied to with the same probability 1/J and
that the common wage posted is
w∗N,J =
(
1 − 1
J
)N−1
,
for otherwise there would be a profitable deviation for any of these J firms. But if a firm that is
not being applied to changes its posting to the same FIC as the J firms applied to, then all J + 1
would be applied to with probability 1/(J + 1) and the J + 1 firms’ expected profit would be
Π
(
w∗N,J ;
1
J + 1
)
= 1 −
(
1 − 1
J + 1
)N
− N
J + 1
(
1 − 1
J
)N−1
.
But 1 − 1/(J + 1) > 1 − 1/J , and therefore
Π
(
w∗N,J ;
1
J + 1
)
>Π
(
w∗N,J+1;
1
J + 1
)
> 0,
and therefore the deviant firm would make strictly positive expected profit, and therefore the
deviation to posting the FIC with wage w∗N,J is indeed a profitable deviation.
This shows that the unique SPNE of the second stage game satisfying the MEU property is
the FIC SPNE. 
Appendix B
The following lemma is useful for the rest of the results.
Lemma B.1.
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
= −
∑N
k=2 pkN(θ)
Nθ2
.
Proof. First, note that ΩN,M(θ) can be expressed as
ΩN,M(θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)
N
Nθ
.
Hence,
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
= −1 − (1 − θ)
N −Nθ(1 − θ)N−1
Nθ2
,
which yields the result. 
Lemma B.2. If firms are restricted to posting standard wage contracts, then there exists a unique
symmetric SPNE and it is such that the wage posted by all firms is given by w˜∗N,M solving(
1 − 1
M
)N−1
=
(
1
M
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
+ΩN,M
(
1
M
))
w
− 1
M − 1
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
u(w)
u′(w)
.
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Proof. Taking the FOC of the profit function Π(w˜) with respect to w˜ yields
∂θ˜
∂w˜
[
N(1 − θ˜ )N−1 −N
(
θ˜
∂ΩN,M(θ˜)
∂θ˜
+ΩN,M(θ˜)
)
w˜
]
= Nθ˜ΩN,M(θ˜).
In a symmetric equilibrium in the second stage game, workers must be indifferent between visit-
ing firm m or any other firm, which implies that F = ΩN,M(θ˜)u(w˜) − ΩN,M(θ)u(w) = 0. The
Implicit Function Theorem then yields that
∂θ˜
∂w˜
= − ΩN,M(θ˜)u
′(w˜)
∂ΩN,M(θ˜)
∂θ˜
u(w˜)− ∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ˜
u(w)
.
Since workers apply to the other firms with probability θ = (1 − θ˜ )/(M − 1), we have that
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ˜
= − ∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
1
(M−1) . This yields that the FOC can be rewritten as
(1 − θ˜ )N−1 =
(
θ˜
∂ΩN,M(θ˜)
∂θ˜
+ΩN,M(θ˜)
)
w˜
− θ˜
u′(w˜)
[
∂ΩN,M(θ˜)
∂θ˜
u(w˜)+ ∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
1
(M − 1)u(w)
]
,
which evaluated at w˜ = w and θ˜ = θ = 1/M yields Ψ (w) = 0 where
Ψ (w) ≡
(
1 − 1
M
)N−1
−
(
1
M
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
+ΩN,M
(
1
M
))
w
+ 1
M − 1
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
u(w)
u′(w)
.
Ψ (0) = (1 − 1/M)N−1 > 0 and Ψ (w) is strictly decreasing since
∂Ψ (w)
∂w
= −
(
1
M
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
+ΩN,M
(
1
M
))
+ 1
M − 1
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
(u′(w))2 − u(w)u′′(w)
(u′(w))2
,
is strictly negative since
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
= −1 − (1 − θ)
N −Nθ(1 − θ)N−1
Nθ2
< 0,
(u′(w))2 − u(w)u′′(w)
(u′(w))2
> 0, and
θ
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
+ΩN,M(θ) = (1 − θ)N−1 > 0.
In addition,
Ψ (1) =
(
1 − 1
M
)N−1
−
(
1 − 1
M
)N−1
− 1
M − 1
(
1 − (1 − 1/M)N
N/M
)
u(1)
u′(1)
,
which is strictly negative. Therefore there exists a unique w ∈ (0,1) solving Ψ (w) = 0. And
given that there is a unique value of θ that makes the workers indifferent between the different
firms, the unique w solving Ψ (w) = 0 is the unique equilibrium wage. 
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Lemma B.3.
ΛN,M =
N [γ (w˜∗N,M)− 1] + b
(N − b)b ×
N∑
k=2
pkN(1/M).
Proof. The result follows directly from Lemma B.1 and by letting b = N/M . 
Lemma B.4.
W˜ ∗N,M ≡
w∗N,M − W˜ ∗N,M
W˜ ∗N,M
= −[1 + (γ (w˜∗N,M)− 1)M]ε(U˜/θ)∣∣θ=1/M.
Proof. First note that
w∗N,M − W˜ ∗N,M
W˜ ∗N,M
= ΛN,M
ΩN,M(1/M)
,
and therefore, replacing ΛN,M by its expression in (25), we have that
W˜ ∗N,M = −
1 +M(γ (w˜∗N,M)− 1)
M − 1 ×
∂ΩN,M(θ)
∂θ
θ
ΩN,M(θ)
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
.
But,
ε(U˜/θ)|θ=1/M = −∂U˜
∂θ
θ
U˜
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
= −∂Ω˜
∂θ
θ
Ω˜
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
= 1
M − 1
∂Ω
∂θ
θ
Ω
∣∣∣∣
θ=1/M
.
Hence,
W˜ ∗N,M = −
[
1 +M(γ (w˜∗N,M)− 1)]ε(U˜/θ)∣∣θ=1/M. 
Appendix C
In this appendix we briefly show that it is possible to find a reasonable perturbation to the
game presented in Section 2 of the main text for which, as the perturbation becomes small, the
equilibrium application strategy profile of workers when two or more firms post payoff equivalent
contracts converges to the application strategy profile where workers apply to these firms with
the same application probability.
Denote by Γ the game presented in Section 2 of the main text, and denote by Γε the following
perturbation of Γ : there is a probability ε > 0 that each firm will renege on its contract posting
(the probability a firm reneges is independent of whether other firms renege), in which case the
firm bargains with the workers who have applied according to the following protocols. If one
worker has applied, with probability β ∈ (0,1) the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
firm, and with complementary probability 1 − β the firm gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer
to the worker. If two or more workers have applied they enter a Bertrand competition for the job.
If two or more workers apply the outcome of the Bertrand competition is that the wage paid is
zero, and the firm hires one worker. If only one worker shows up, if the worker gets to propose he
proposes to be paid a wage equal to 1, whereas if it is the firm that proposes it will propose a wage
of zero, so that the expected utility for the worker is βu(1)+ (1 −β)u(0) = βu(1). Hence, when
two or more firms post payoff-equivalent contracts such that ue(wkm) = ue(wkj ) = u for all k, the
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expected utility of applying to one of these firms, say firm m, given that all other workers apply
to that firm with probability θm > 0 is
Uεm(w; θm) = (1 − ε)u+ ε(1 − θm)N−1βu(1).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that there are J > 1 firms posting payoff-equivalent con-
tracts ue(wkm) = ue(wkj ) = u for all k, and assume that these firms are firms 1,2, . . . , J . If a Nash
equilibrium θ of the application subgame is such that
∑J
j=1 θj = θ > 0, then any application pro-
file θ˜ such that
∑J
j=1 θ˜j = θ is also a Nash equilibrium of the application subgame. However, it
is clear that the unique Nash equilibrium of the application subgame of the perturbed game Γε is
such that θj = θ/J for all j = 1,2, . . . , J . It follows that if we consider any strictly decreasing
sequence (εk)∞k=1 such that limk→+∞ εk = 0, we have that limk→+∞ θεk = θ/J . That is, as the
perturbation to the game Γ vanishes, the application strategy profile of workers for the game Γε
converges to an application strategy profile such that workers apply with the same probability to
firms posting payoff-equivalent contracts such that ue(wkm) = ue(wkj ) = u for all k.
Appendix D
In this appendix we examine how our results would be affected if we restricted the number
of firms to be integer-valued. To avoid repetition we only highlight the parts where the results
would differ.
D.1. Social planner’s problem
If we ignore the constraint that the number of active firms has to be an integer, then we obtain
that workers receive their expected marginal product both in the finite and limit markets. How-
ever, if the number of firms has to be integer-valued, then in finite markets workers generically
do not obtain their expected marginal product. This is because if we ignore the integer constraint
the efficient number of firms, M˜e , is the solution to Eq. (5), and M˜e is generically not an integer.
Therefore the social planner’s optimal choice of M , Me, is either int(M˜e) or int(M˜e)+ 1, where
int(x) denotes the integer part of the real x. If Me = int(M˜e) < M˜e, then
1 − (1 − 1/Me)N − (N/Me)× (1 − 1/Me)N−1 > c,
which implies the transfer workers receive from the social planner is strictly greater than their
expected marginal product, while if Me = int(M˜e)+ 1, then
1 − (1 − 1/Me)N − (N/Me)× (1 − 1/Me)N−1 < c,
and therefore the transfer workers receive from the social planner is strictly less than their ex-
pected marginal product. But in either case the fact that workers do not receive their expected
marginal product is solely a by-product of the fact that the number of active firms must be
an integer. Note that the recourse to lotteries to deal with the integer problem is of no use
here.
Consequently, Proposition 1 will be different, and instead be the following.
Proposition 5. The constrained efficient allocation is such that workers apply to all firms with
the same probability and all workers receive the same transfer. Moreover:
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(i) In the limit market the ratio of workers to firms be solves (6) and workers receive their
expected marginal product e−be ;
(ii) In a market with a finite number N of workers, the social planner’s choice of the number
of active firms Me is either int(M˜e) or int(M˜e) + 1, where M˜e solves (5). If Me < M˜e ,
then workers receive strictly more than their expected marginal product, whereas if Me =
int(M˜e)+ 1, then workers receive strictly less than their expected marginal product. Other-
wise workers receive exactly their expected marginal product.
D.2. Equilibrium entry
In the paper, ignoring the integer constraint, there exists a unique FIC equilibrium, and it is
such that the equilibrium active number of firms, M∗, is such that Eq. (19) is satisfied. However,
if the number of firms has to be an integer, then M∗ must be such that
Π∗N,M∗  c and Π∗N,M∗+1 < c.
There are three cases to consider. If Me = M˜e, then M∗ = Me, and workers’ payoff in the
FIC equilibrium equals the transfer they receive in the constrained efficient allocation since in
both cases they receive their expected marginal product, so the FIC equilibrium allocation is
constrained efficient. If, however, Me is not equal to M˜e, then the FIC equilibrium allocation
fails to be constrained efficient, and therefore one cannot decentralize exactly the constrained
efficient allocation. In fact, if Me < M˜e , then although clearly we still have that M∗ = Me ,
workers’ payoff in the FIC equilibrium is strictly less than the transfer they receive in the con-
strained efficient allocation since in equilibrium they receive their expected marginal product
whereas in the constrained efficient allocation they would receive strictly more. The differ-
ence between the two is the net expected profit that firms capture since in this case we have
that Π∗N,M∗ > c. Finally, if Me > M˜e, then the maximum equilibrium number of firms M∗ is
equal to Me − 1, and therefore the number of active firms in equilibrium is not constrained
efficient. Moreover, workers’ payoff is less than what they would obtain in the constrained
efficient allocation. The maximum equilibrium number of firms in an FIC equilibrium in this
case is strictly less than the constrained efficient number because if Me firms were to be active
then an FIC SPNE for the second stage would imply active firms make negative expected net
profit.
Again, the FIC equilibrium is generically not constrained efficient in a finite market for a
purely technical reason: the number of active firms must be an integer. The generic failure to
obtain efficiency of the FIC equilibrium in a finite market can however be overcomed by allowing
workers to costlessly set up a marketmaking agency which can charge or subsidize entrepreneurs
for setting up a firm.
D.3. Equilibrium entry with marketmaking
Defining UN,M(σM ; τ) as the expected utility of workers given that there are M active firms,
that the SPNE of the second stage game is σM , and that the fee charged by the marketmaker to
firms is τ , we can define an equilibrium with marketmaking as follows.
Definition 5. An equilibrium with marketmaking is a fee τ , an entry strategy e, and a strategy
profile for the second stage game σ = (σ i )Mi=1 such that:
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(i) Given σ = (σ i )Mi=1,
(a) and given τ and e−m,
em =
{1, if mM(e; τ);
0, if m>M(e; τ),
where M(e; τ) is such that for all m M(e; τ), ΠN,M(e;τ)(wM(e;τ)m ;σM(e;τ)−m ) − τ  c
and for all i >M(e; τ), ΠN,i(wim;σ i−m)− τ < c for some m ∈ {M(e; τ)+ 1, . . . , i};
(b) and given M(e; τ) implied by (a), τ is such that UN,M(e;τ)(σM(e;τ); τ) 
UN,M(e;˜τ)(σM(e;˜τ); τ˜ ) for all τ˜ .
(ii) For all i, σ i is an SPNE of the second stage game as given in Definition 1.
One can think of the marketmaking agency in two ways. First, one can simply think of it as
a marketmaking agency set up by workers and therefore acting on behalf of workers. Alterna-
tively, one can think of the marketmaking agency as being the winner of a public tender among
competitive marketmakers, the winner of the tender being chosen by workers. In both cases, the
marketmaker(s) are constrained in that all workers and firms must be in the same marketplace,
which is the same restriction faced by the social planner, and marketmakers are free to post any
fee, and this fee is charged to entrepreneurs. If an entrepreneur pays a fee, it is collected by the
marketmaker who distributes it evenly across all workers. If an entrepreneur receives a subsidy
(the fee is negative), then the marketmaker collects fees from the workers after their wages have
been paid and distributes it evenly across all entrepreneurs who set up a firm.
In the case where Me = int(M˜e) < M˜e, in the FIC equilibrium without marketmaking M∗ =
Me and active firms make strictly positive expected net profit. Hence, a marketmaker can charge
the Me entrepreneurs who set up a firm an entry fee
τ = Π∗N,Me − c,
so entrepreneurs make zero expected profit net of the entry fee and setup cost. When the fee is
redistributed evenly among workers we obtain that each worker’s payment in equilibrium equals
the payment he receives in the constrained efficient allocation. In fact, we have from (11) and (16)
that
M ×Π∗N,M +N ×w∗N,M = QN,M(1/M).
If entrepreneurs setting up a firm each have to pay an entry fee τ , we can use the fact that
qN,M(1/M) = QN,M(1/M)−Mc to write a worker’s payoff as
w∗N,M +
M
N
τ = qN,M(1/M)−M × (Π
∗
N,M − c − τ)
N
.
Hence, if τ is such that Π∗N,M −c = τ , each worker receives qN,M(1/M)/N , which is the transfer
they receive in the constrained efficient allocation when M = Me.
In the case where Me = int(M˜e) + 1, if the equilibrium number of active firms were equal
to the number chosen by the social planner, firms would be making negative expected net profit.
The marketmaker can in this case offer the entrepreneurs setting up a firm a subsidy equal to the
expected net loss Π∗N,Me − c to induce the correct number of active firms. And since the subsidy
is chosen so that firms make zero expected net profit, the payment each worker receives net of
his share of the subsidy is qN,M(1/M)/N for M = Me , which is again what a worker receives
in the constrained efficient allocation.
We summarize this section with the following proposition.
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Proposition.
(i) Allowing firms to post wage-vacancy contracts is a sufficient condition to be able to decen-
tralize the constrained efficient allocation in finite and limit markets if one can ignore the
constraint that the number of active firms is an integer.
(ii) If the integer constraint is binding, then wage-vacancy contracts are not sufficient to decen-
tralize the constrained efficient allocation in finite markets.
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